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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In the summer of 2011, Congress made a deal to force its own hand on controlling the 
deficit. The deal would reduce deficits by $2.1 trillion over ten years. Discretionary 
spending caps went into effect immediately to cut $900 billion, and the rest of the work 
was up to a temporary congressional committee, the Joint Committee on Deficit 
Reduction. If the Committee failed to come up with an additional $1.5 trillion in deficit 
reduction by January of 2013, an automatic budgetary control mechanism called 
sequestration would go into effect. The Committee of six members from each chamber 
set to work on a budget plan; they did not reach a deal. Congress still had over a year to 
find the cuts. But the sequestration deadline passed, and Congress set a new deadline for 
March 1, 2013. As the extra days quickly slipped by, Democrats again brought up fears 
that the agreed-to levels of sequestration would be devastating to the middle class. They 
said, “Draconian cuts will hurt the middle class; we need a balanced approach to deficit 
reduction,” to which Republicans responded, “We don’t have a spending problem; we 
have a deficit problem.” These are the opposing talking points that have dominated the 
deficit debate. They are today’s version of a centuries-old debate about the proper size 
and scope of government, and they come head to head in the federal budget process. 
Today, the central focus of the federal budget process is the production of a 
comprehensive legislative budget, or a concurrent budget resolution. The Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (CBA) created the House and Senate
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budget committees to conduct this task. Each budget committee is supposed to pass a 
budget resolution, and then the two are supposed to reconcile the differences between 
their budgets in the concurrent budget resolution, an annual budgetary framework whose 
funding levels are enforceable over appropriations and authorization activity throughout 
the fiscal year. But since 1974, Congress has attempted additional budgetary reforms 
geared towards enhanced controls over comprehensive budgeting practices. Budgeting is 
a polarizing activity no matter what the process looks like because it is intrinsically a 
battle over policy priorities. Reviewing budget aggregates annually, as Congress has 
sought to do ever since the enactment of the CBA, transforms many battles over separate 
policy priorities into one immense battle over the biggest question in American politics: 
the role of government in society.  
Funding the federal government has been a central cause of some of the most 
significant events in our nation’s history. One of the main grievances against King 
George was improper taxation. The fledgling nation then ran into trouble when the 
federal government under the Articles of Confederation lacked sufficient power to collect 
taxes. After the Civil War, the nation’s first major conflict, Union veterans’ pensions 
became the biggest item in the federal budget aside from the interest on the debt; the 
payment of pensions to Northerners and not Southerners revealed the priorities of the 
majority. Thus, where the government directed money shaped the national economy as 
well as national perceptions.1 
The budget process has always affected the general public in the form of taxes 
and outlays, but what happens in between, where policy is made, was of little interest to 
                                                      
1
 Burt Folsom, “The Economic Costs of the Civil War,” The Foundation for Economic Education, March 
23, 2011, http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/the-economic-costs-of-the-civil-war#axzz2LVsBifG6 
(accessed January 25, 2013). 
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the general public until roughly 40 years ago, around the time of the CBA’s passage. 
Deficits were becoming a public issue, and government was becoming more involved in 
all areas of life. The process by which the government formulates the substance of tax 
and spending policy—or, how we as a nation decide what our priorities are and how to 
fund them—simultaneously became increasingly important to the general public. Voters 
are also actively concerned about the gridlock effect of partisan polarization. The issue 
that sent this concern deep into the national consciousness was budgeting. While the 
debate about the proper role of government reaches back to early American political 
discourse between Hamilton and Jefferson, the gridlock Congress currently experiences 
over budget issues is relatively new. Phrases such as “government shutdown,” “fiscal 
cliff,” and “across-the-board cuts” are interlocked with polarization today. The nation 
held its breath as lawmakers barely avoided shutdown in 2011 because the parties could 
not find middle ground. Then, the fiscal cliff battle sought to avert a perfect storm of 
revenue increases and spending cuts (the expiration of the Bush tax cuts along with the 
across-the-board spending cuts that Congress set up as a self-enforcing measure in the 
2011 debt deal). This spring, the across-the-board cuts went into effect, and averting 
blame became the primary goal of both parties. In short, partisanship and budgeting are 
side by side on the political stage today, not just related but inseparable. This paper will 
explore how they are related in American political development—specifically, how and 
to what extent the introduction of comprehensive budgeting into Congress with the CBA 
has contributed to partisan polarization in Congress. The finding of this study is that the 
implementation of comprehensive budgeting in Congress, along with subsequent attempts 
to place additional controls on comprehensive budgeting practices, has magnified and 
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accelerated the effects of the many polarizing forces that have characterized the last 40 
years of American politics.  
  
 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
To place this study within the existing literature, this chapter reviews existing scholarship 
regarding the federal budget process and the increased partisan polarization in Congress 
since the 1970s. This chapter also examines the small body of literature that addresses the 
relationship between federal budgeting and partisan polarization.  In short, the extensive 
scholarship on the federal budget process and congressional polarization have 
occasionally mentioned the relationship between the two, but neither discipline has 
addressed in any depth whether or how the shift to comprehensive budgeting that began 
in 1974 has contributed to partisan polarization. 
 
I. THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 
Budgeting is about rationing scarce resources—determining the proper distribution of a 
limited revenue stream.2 The history of budgeting is hidden behind a continuous debate 
over how big government should be, based on various economic and moral questions. 
Assertions about the proper size of government typically rely on a series of judgments 
regarding where and how often government involvement is beneficial. In Deficit Politics: 
The Search for Balance in American Politics (2002), governance and budget scholar 
Donald F. Kettl explores how budgeting relates to key political institutions and policies.3
                                                      
2
 Donald F. Kettl, Deficit Politics: The Search for Balance in American Politics (New York: Pearson 
Education, Inc., 2003), 1. 
3
 Kettl, Deficit Politics, xvii. 
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One of his most astute observations is that “politics is…inevitably about budgeting. 
Without public money behind government decisions, public policy is an empty concept.”4 
But he argues that the relationship goes both ways: “…all budgetary decisions are 
inevitably about politics.”5 Budgeting, he says, requires trade-offs that confront us with 
“deep-seated conflicts among values,” and the act of resolving those conflicts “is the very 
definition of politics.”6 The process by which the government makes budgetary decisions 
thus provides a cornerstone of the structure for political interaction. 
 The Founders intended for budgetary decisions to happen primarily in the 
legislative branch; the Constitution gives Congress the power of the purse so that 
budgeting decisions will reflect the priorities of voters as closely as possible. In 
Federalist No. 58, James Madison argued, “This power over the purse may, in fact, be 
regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm 
the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, 
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.”7 Being a deliberative body 
by design, with members driven by distinct political and personal motivations, Congress 
finds budgeting to be a difficult task. But after handing much of its budgetary power over 
to the executive for many years, Congress wanted it back in 1974 when it passed the 
CBA. In its requirement of a concurrent budget resolution, the CBA created a medium for 
the national discussion of one of the nation’s deepest political and philosophical debates: 
the role of government. The CBA charged the newly created House and Senate budget 
                                                      
4
 Kettl, Deficit Politics, 1. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Kettl, Deficit Politics, 2. 
7
 James Madison, “Federalist No. 58: Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as 
the Progress of Population Demands Considered,” February 20, 1788, 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa58.htm (accessed April 28, 2013). 
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committees to begin constructing the overall budgetary framework each year. The 
resulting resolution would include aggregate spending levels, as well as debt, deficit, and 
revenue levels. Soon after the CBA’s passage, the concurrent budget resolution also 
became a tool through which the congressional majority launched its agenda and 
defended its view of the proper shape and size of government. The concurrent budget 
resolution does not have the force of law, but its funding levels are enforceable over 
appropriations and authorizing committee action throughout the fiscal year.  
Political scientist John W. Ellwood contends that the “outcome of any public 
sector budget process is the result of the interaction of three factors: the economic 
conditions in which the budget is made; the policy desires of decisionmakers (and, in a 
representative system, of the electorate); and the procedures that govern the 
decisionmaking process.”8 The 1974 budget reforms changed the latter factor 
considerably, and it did so at a time when economic conditions were tightening and like-
minded decision makers were scattered across party lines and seeking new partisan 
homes. The reforms made comprehensive budgeting, or what congressional scholar 
Lance T. LeLoup calls “macrobudgeting,” a part of our national consciousness. Congress 
no longer evaluates the merits of individual programs and revenue bills separately, as it 
did prior to 1974. Rather, post-1974 budgeting requires evaluating the relative merits of 
potential spending. The CBA thus institutionalized and popularized budgeting as Kettl 
defines it: a process of trade-offs between many options competing for limited resources. 
In theory, according to prominent budget scholar Allen Schick, the CBA allows the 
                                                      
8
 John W. Ellwood. “The Great Exception: The Congressional Budget Process in an Age of 
Decentralization,” in Congress Reconsidered, 3rd edition, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1985), 315. 
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budget to be controlled by “top-down constraints” instead of by the “‘bottom-up’ 
demands” of executive branch agencies and programs.9 But the goal of coordinated 
congressional budgeting required the centralization of the process within Congress. 
Congress had reclaimed primary control over revenue and spending decisions, but with 
new institutions and timelines to follow, it had also created new challenges.10 Budgeting 
decisions regarding proper levels of spending and revenue, as well as the relative size of 
budget items within that scope, within a tight annual timeframe, increased the demands of 
the budget process. 
Budgeting is perhaps the central component of governance, so doing it well is 
important politically as well as substantively. In the view of the electorate, budgeting 
well corresponds with deficit levels. Six of the past fourteen years did not see a 
concurrent budget resolution. Congress now views the budget resolution as optional, as 
budget scholar Philip Joyce concluded.11 Although the process of funding the government 
does not require a concurrent resolution, the public views a missed budget resolution as a 
failure of governance. Kettl argues that the difference between revenues and spending 
(the deficit or surplus) is the “single most-watched gauge of budgeting’s big trade-offs” 
and that the importance of deficits to the public has made the balance of revenues and 
expenditures a central concern for lawmakers.12  
                                                      
9
 Allen Schick, Evolutions in Budgetary Practice: Allen Schick and the OECD Senior Budget Officials, 
(OECD Publishing, 2009), 42. 
10
 Dennis S. Ippolito, Why Budgets Matter: Budget Policy and American Politics (University Park: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 185. 
11
 Philip Joyce, “Strengthening the Budget Committees: Institutional Reforms to Promote Fiscally 
Responsible Budgeting in Congress,” The Pew Charitable Trusts (January 2011), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Strengthening-
Budget-Committees-Jan-2011.pdf (accessed April 25, 2013). 
12
 Kettl, Deficit Politics, 2.  
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One of the main issues dividing budget scholars is whether or not budget process 
reform can help curb the growth of deficits. Kettl takes the position that there is no 
“magic bullet” or “miracle cure” in budgeting; rather, it will take political leadership and 
the courage.13 According to Kettl, “reformers seek to replace the problems of political 
decision making with a process that will produce the results automatically instead.” 
(Emphasis supplied.)14 Kettl’s perspective is common among budget scholars: Congress 
can always circumvent procedure, so relying on procedure is hopeless. Political scientist 
Aaron Wildavsky agreed that politics, not the budget process, is at fault with regard to 
budgetary friction.15 He argued that elected officials “disagree about policy not because 
they cannot agree on the budget; they cannot agree on the budget because they are 
fundamentally at odds over policy.”16 With regard to curbing the growth of deficits, Kettl 
worries that the problem is not process but that we as a nation do not tend to ask the 
follow-up question: “How much are we willing to pay to get?” Kettl argues that we do 
not tend to talk about the size of government in terms of a balance between what we want 
and what we are willing to pay for. If we did, we might have to make conscientious 
sacrifices.17 He wrote this in 2003, when the budget committees had been in place for 
quite some time, specifically tasked with having that very conversation. Arguably, we 
have begun to ask that second question in the latest development of budget politics, as 
                                                                                                                                                              
John Makin and Norman Ornstein, Debt and Taxes: How America Got Into Its Budget Mess and What to 
Do About It (Crown: 1994), 4. 
13
 Kettl, Deficit Politics, xi. 
14
 Kettl, Deficit Politics, 109. 
15
 Aaron Wildavsky, “If You Can’t Budget, How Can You Govern?” in Budgeting and Governing, ed. 
Aaron Wildavsky (Transaction Publishers, 2000), 326.  
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Kettl, Deficit Politics, xviii. 
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debt and partisanship have forced us to think about what sacrifices we would be willing 
to make. But the conclusions are radically different on either side of the aisle. 
Another question that divides budget scholars is whether a balanced budget is a 
useful goal of budgeting. Kettl assumes that arriving at a balanced budget is desirable—
that it is or should be the ultimate goal of good budgeting. On the other hand, in Balanced 
Budgets and American Politics (1988), James D. Savage centers on the question of why 
Americans are so concerned with balancing the budget and whether that is a worthwhile 
concern. He says budgetary politics encapsulates the public debate over deficits, spending 
priorities, fiscal policy, how much government should intervene in the economy, and the 
role of government in society.18 But he focuses on the concept of deficits, arguing that 
political leaders have used the concept of a balanced budget to “guide public policy and 
public discourse and [act] as a symbol for competing visions of government and society 
in a manner unique to American politics.”19 But, he argues, that emphasis distracts from 
the more important issue of determining policy priorities and funding the government. 
Kettl says the budget is the wind tunnel of American politics—the channel 
through which lawmakers test the policy priority rank of government programs—because 
it is where government’s many choices and challenges meet.20 The pre-1974 budget 
process, perhaps ill-advisedly, allowed these many choices to happen disjointedly and 
without concern for the context of the overall budget. The post-1974 process put those 
choices and challenges—and the lawmakers tasked with addressing them—in direct 
conversation with each other. 
                                                      
18
 James D. Savage, Balanced Budgets and American Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 1. 
19
 Ibid.  
20
 Kettl, Deficit Politics, 3. 
11 
 
 
 
II. PARTY POLARIZATION 
Experts have defined “partisanship” and “party polarization” in several ways, generally 
noting, of course, that the definitions involve a relationship between the party in 
government, the party in the electorate, and the party organization. Political scientist 
David W. Rohde describes partisanship as the impact and influence of political parties on 
the operation of the Congress and the behavior of its members.21 Political scientist John 
Haskell argues that one aspect of partisanship is the effort to score points against one’s 
political opponents.22 The other aspect, of course, is “genuine [expression] of a particular 
viewpoint.”23 With regard to the development of party polarization in Congress over 
time, as many scholars of Congress and polarization have noted, one aspect is the 
movement toward ideological unity within the parties, and the other is the distance 
between them. 
Haskell notes that the party system was “not part of the original ‘genome’” of 
Congress.24 But the division and extremity of factions and parties have affected Congress 
in waves; the current divide is by no means our nation’s first encounter with polarization. 
Factional divisions in Congress are as old as budget policy, extending back to the 
dominant Federalist Party, led by Alexander Hamilton, and Thomas Jefferson’s 
counterattack with the Democratic-Republican Party.25 The U.S. has also experienced 
sharp regional divisions. Regarding the War of 1812, Congress voted on regional rather 
than party lines, and leading up to and continuing after the Civil War, the parties were 
                                                      
21
 David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991), 2. 
22
 John Haskell, Congress in Context, (Westview Press, 2010), 376. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Haskell, Congress in Context, 344. 
25
 Haskell, Congress in Context, 376. 
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completely divided on regional lines.26 Political journalist and author Michael Lind wrote 
about regionalism as a broader trend, identifying New England as historically “the 
heartland of opposition to foreign wars and the U.S. military establishment” and the 
South, “especially the Tidewater South,” as the opposite.27 Regional cracks in the current 
party structure are more superficial, although they can still affect legislative outcomes. 
For example, transportation and farming legislation tend to pass on regional rather than 
partisan lines.28 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, Speakers of the House Thomas B. Reed (1889 – 
1891, 1895 – 1899) and Joseph G. Cannon (1903 – 1911), illustrated the leadership’s 
ability to channel party power.29 According to Rohde, the famously heavy-handed 
“Czars” became the historical standard for “strong party leadership.”30 Cannon in 
particular ruled every aspect of legislative activity with reward-and-punishment-style 
leadership. After that, polarization fell again and remained low until roughly the 93rd 
Congress (1973 – 1974). Although estimates of where the nadir lies vary, many 
congressional scholars mark the 93rd Congress as the turning point that led to today’s 
circumstances: polarization continuing to climb after the first decade of the 21st century 
became the most polarized decade since Reconstruction.31 At times, the parties have been 
able to come together on single issues such as defense, farming, and even education 
                                                      
26
 Michael Lind, “Civil War by Other Means,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 5 (September 1999): 124. (accessed 
February 25, 2013). 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Haskell, Congress in Context, 379. 
29
 “Reed, Thomas Brackett, (1839 – 1902),” Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774 – 
Present, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=R000128 (accessed April 24, 2013). 
Richard H. Pildes, “Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in 
America,” California Law Review 99, no. 2 (April 2011): 319. (accessed February 25, 2013). 
30
 Rohde, Parties and Leaders, 4. 
31
 Sean M. Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 23. 
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legislation; internal party divisions also exist today over issues such as immigration.32 
But the bottom line is that the parties converged near the 93rd Congress and then 
diverged, “almost without exception,” according to party polarization expert Sean M. 
Theriault, every Congress after that.33 
The history of party polarization involves two coinciding phenomena: an 
ideological sorting and a widening ideological gulf. Historically, according to Haskell, 
what we typically identify as the initial rise of party polarization was, more accurately, 
the ideological sorting of the parties. Congress has never been free of conflict, he says, 
just as society has never been free of divisions, and “those divisions were often every bit 
as sharp as the ones we see today, and sometimes more so.”34 The important distinction 
he makes is that “the divisions did not … always divide along party lines, as they tend to 
now.” (Emphasis supplied.)35 Party unity scores over time help illustrate this ideological 
sorting. 
                                                      
32
 Haskell, Congress in Context, 379. 
33
 Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress, 30. 
34
 Haskell, Congress in Context, 376. 
35
 Ibid. 
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Data show the percentage of members voting with a majority of their party on party unity votes. Party unity 
votes are those roll calls on which a majority of Democrats vote against a majority of Republicans. 
Percentages are calculated to eliminate the impact of absences as follows: unity = (unity)/(unity + 
opposition).36 
 
The figure above shows the ideological homogeneity of the parties over time. Leading 
into the 1970s, the parties were not ideologically consistent because of factions within the 
parties. But around the 1970s, conservatives began to move toward the Republican Party 
and liberals toward the Democratic Party. Today, the parties are approaching a level near 
100 percent unity. 
Not only have the parties sorted out, but the gulf between the parties has been 
widening, with an identifiable, sharp increase starting, again, around the 1970s. 
                                                      
36
 “Table 5-10 Party Unity in Congressional Voting, 1954–2010 (percent),” Vital Statistics on American 
Politics 2011-2012, ed. Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2011), 
http://library.cqpress.com/vsap/document.php?id=vsap11_tab5-10 (accessed March 30, 2013), 207-8. 
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The graph above illustrates the ideological distance between the political 
polarization has not always gone in one direction; it was quite high in the early 20
century, the parties experienced some combination of intraparty division and interparty 
convergence through the Great Depression and World War II, and th
shot up again, bringing the parties further apart than they have ever been. The question of 
what started the parties on the track to where 
increasingly far apart—has captivated many scholars.
The period of relatively unpolarized consistency under Representative 
Rayburn’s speakership (1940 
“Textbook Congress.”38 
                                                     
37
 Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, “
http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp (accessed April 28, 2013).
38
 “Rayburn, Samuel Taliaferro, (1882 
1774 – Present, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=R000082 (accessed April 24, 
2013).  
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organized political parties, and strong House norms and Senate folkways.”39 Within the 
party structure, the South was an anomaly. It was overwhelmingly Democratic in name, 
but in ideology, many Democratic representatives of the South in the post-World War II 
era were quite conservative. During that era, political scientist V.O. Key conducted an 
extensive analysis of the South in Southern Politics in State and Nation (1949). His 
observations pinned down an indispensable element of party disunity in this era: the 
South had “no political parties—at least as we have defined them.”40 Southern politics, he 
says, was its own political world; it was both one party, no party, and many parties: 
...within the Democratic party in the southern states factional groups are the 
equivalent of political parties elsewhere. In fact, the Democratic party in most 
states of the South is merely a holding-company for a congeries of transient 
squabbling factions, most of which fail by far to meet the standards of 
permanence, cohesiveness, and responsibility that characterize the political 
party.41 
 
The country was certainly divided, but political scientist Alan Abramowitz points out that 
there were “pro-war and anti-war, pro-civil rights and anti-civil rights, and social liberal 
and conservative factions” on both sides of the aisle.42 As late as 1968, George Wallace 
was commenting that there was “not a dime’s worth of difference between the parties.”43 
The “end of ideology” was declared.44 But Key provides a poignant reminder that 
political parties do not become meaningless when they suffer from internal division: 
Even when divergences [between political parties] are by no means sharp, there 
often remains a fairly cohesive group of party leaders held together by the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress, 26. 
39
 Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress, 51.  
40
 V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1949), 16. 
41
 Key, Southern Politics, 16. 
42
 Ezra Klein, “From ‘Mad Men’ to a Mad Congress,” Bloomberg, April 12, 2013, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-12/from-mad-men-to-a-mad-congress.html (accessed April 17, 
2013). 
43
 Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress, 7. 
44
 Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress, 26. 
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ambition to retain or to win office. To gain office they must criticize the “ins,” 
manufacture a new issue to attract votes, or put forth a candidate superior to the 
champion of the opposition.45 
 
Haskell says the roughly 25-year period of “relative comity between the parties” before 
the 1980s was largely a result of the dominance of the inability of Republicans do what 
was necessary to attract votes and gain office. Republicans, he says, “were resigned to 
their lot in life as a permanent minority, and a ‘get along–go along’ mentality held sway 
at least some of the time.”46 What we can gather from these observations is that divisions 
and conflict still existed between the parties, but perhaps, without the organizational 
advantage of clear political parties, that conflict did not materialize and paralyze 
Congress as it does today. Vast evidence points to the conclusion that a combination of 
factors in the 1960s and 1970s set us on course toward today’s hyperpolarized conditions, 
when we can clearly identify an ideological gulf between the most conservative 
Democrat and the most liberal Republican. 
Theriault chronicles the debate over what caused this phenomenon in Party 
Polarization in Congress (2008). He sought to weave together the existing body of 
literature on party polarization and explain how the various disparate explanations that 
scholars have offered are complementary to one another. He estimates a percentage of 
responsibility for each possible explanation. The key conclusions he draws are: 1) Party 
polarization has been evident for about 35 to 40 years, especially since the 93rd Congress, 
2) interest group ratings, ideology scores, and roll call summary measures all show the 
same divergence in party polarization, and 3) House and Senate polarization have 
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generally paralleled each other over time.47 Rohde argues that “party voting is the 
consequence of influences inside and outside the Congress.”48 Theriault explains these 
two categories of influences in terms of electoral factors and institutional factors. The 
electoral factors that scholars have explored include partisan redistricting, geographic and 
political sorting, and the rise of extreme party activists, among others. Pundits and 
observers prefer to ascribe partisan redistricting with a significant portion of party 
polarization. The idea is that gerrymandering creates safe districts that are increasingly 
polarized between one another. Theriault cites support of this theory through 
congressional scholar Norman Ornstein, who says, “Congressional redistricting…has 
eliminated most competitive seats and thus removed most centrists and moderates from 
both parties.”49 Political scientists John N. Friedman and Richard T. Holden have 
defended the polarizing effects of gerrymandering extensively. They point out that 
incumbent reelection rates have risen substantially since the mid-20th century.50 They 
worry that technological advancements in redistricting “have effectively allowed 
representatives to choose their voters, rather than the converse.”51 But Theriault argues 
that the Senate has polarized at the same rate as the House, as party unity scores have 
generally paralleled each other over time (though the Senate lags slightly on the distance 
between the parties, remaining roughly 80 percent as polarized as the House52). 
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Data show percentage of members voting with a majority of their party on party unity votes. Party unity 
votes are those roll calls on which a majority of Democrats vote against a majority of Republicans. 
Percentages are calculated to eliminate the impact of absences as follows: unity = (unity)/(unity + 
opposition).53 
 
Gerrymandering might be a part of the explanation.54 Theriault estimates that it accounts 
for ten to twenty percent of the total amount of polarization since the 93rd Congress. 
“Down-ticket” or “straight-ticket” voting, which Theriault does not address, might 
partially connect congressional gerrymandering to Senate polarization. But 
gerrymandering does not adequately explain the polarization of the Senate.55 
The second electoral factor that Theriault offers as an explanation is a geographic 
sorting of partisans since the 1970s. He says the voting habits of individuals in close 
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geographical proximity to each other are increasingly similar.56 Citizens’ voter 
identification matches their voting habits more often, and voters have sorted into 
“politically homogenous neighborhoods” (and states) based on income levels, racial 
demographics, and personal affinities.57 This phenomenon is “quite independent of the 
manipulation of congressional district boundaries,” so Theriault posits that it explains 
Senate polarization better than redistricting does.58 It could also help explain Friedman 
and Holden’s concern that House incumbents seem increasingly safe. The end result of 
increasingly homogenous districts caused either by redistricting or by geographic sorting 
is that members tend to enjoy a heightened incumbency advantage, helping them win by 
wider margins and emboldening them to pursue partisan objectives and feel less inclined 
to compromise.59 According to this theory, therefore, increasingly homogenous districts 
amplify both forms of party polarization: ideological homogeneity and increasing 
distance between the parties. Heightened incumbency advantage in general elections 
means tougher primary battles; party activists have begun capitalizing on this situation. 
The third electoral explanation of polarization is the increased importance of 
increasingly extreme party activists in the nomination process. In homogenous districts, 
the nomination process is the real battleground for special interests.60 Theriault says the 
effect on polarization is that, “as the most important voter shifts from the median voter in 
the general election to the median voter in the primary, members become increasingly 
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concerned with satisfying a more ideologically extreme constituency.”61 So, more 
homogeneity means more extreme party activism.62 When party professionals lost power 
to single-issue interest groups, moderate candidates found themselves pushed aside in 
favor of “ideologically pure” choices.63 Once elected, these members must answer to the 
partisan constituents who elected them.64 This phenomenon can help explain the 
increased number of ideological roll call votes. A few “marginal districts” remain—
districts that roughly split votes between the top two presidential candidates.65 But even 
members from those districts elect increasingly extreme candidates.66 Even though the 
two parties’ constituencies are almost twice as polarized now as they were 32 years ago, 
Congress has polarized more than the electorate.67 According to Theriault, a significant 
majority of congressional party polarization is attributable to members’ ideological 
voting habits, which exceed their constituents’ partisan growth.68 The electoral 
explanation, he says, provided the “initial jolt” for congressional polarization; members 
would not alter their behavior unless “their relationship with their constituents [had] … 
changed.”69 Theriault sums up the relationship between Congress and the electorate: 
“Even if not all moderate districts have vanished, the more polarized members coming 
from more partisan districts pursue more polarized politics by voting for more polarized 
leaders who implement a more polarized legislative agenda and more polarizing 
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legislative procedures.”70 So, rather than choosing between the many competing 
explanations of partisan polarization, Theriault argues that “the relationship among 
constituency change, institutional change, and party polarization is more accurately 
understood as a vicious cycle.”71 In other words, party polarization is a cyclical and 
many-faceted phenomenon. 
The sorting out and polarization of Congress happens through two separate but 
related phenomena—what Theriault calls member replacement and adaptation. Both are 
fundamentally electorate-driven. In replacement, the electorate replaces a member with a 
more ideologically extreme representative. The resulting “seat by seat changes…provide 
the micro-building blocks” for party polarization over time.72 Polarization by member 
replacement can be sudden, if, for example, a moderate incumbent falls to a more 
extreme opponent from the other party (most common in volatile elections such as the 
2010 midterms), or it can be gradual, for example, if a moderate Republican falls in the 
primary to a slightly more conservative challenger or in the general election to a solid 
liberal.73 Adaptation is more gradual and difficult to trace. In adaptation, a member 
adjusts his voting habits in order to satisfy his constituents and party leadership. The 
adjustment may be superficial, or it may be a real ideological shift in the direction of his 
constituents or colleagues. Theriault estimates that adaptation has accounted for 35.2 
percent of House polarization and 38.0 percent of Senate polarization over the 32 years 
leading up to 2005. The majority of polarization has occurred through replacement, 
although incumbents have also produced some of the polarization by adjusting to fit their 
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parties’ “ideological homes.”74 Replacement can also force adaptation. For example, 
McCain was a moderate Republican who had to swing right after the wide-scale 
replacement of the 2010 Tea Party-dominated midterm. The rapid polarization that 
happened over the past four decades or so is even more remarkable considering the 
increase in the incumbency advantage over roughly the same time period, especially 
since the majority of that polarization occurred through replacement.75 For party 
polarization to have occurred rapidly under incumbent-protected conditions, the 
replacements that did happen must have constituted rapid ideological shifts. 
The rise of party leadership in place of strong committee leadership is also a 
likely factor in rising party polarization. As each party’s constituents have become more 
internally homogenous, the rank-and-file members of Congress became more willing to 
cede power to their party leaders, equipping them to entice or force party loyalty among 
the rank and file. Today, party leaders use their control over campaign resources, 
committee assignments, and the legislative agenda (for the majority party) to enforce 
loyalty to their agenda within the rank and file.76 Individual lawmakers also acquired 
power by “violating the norms of specialization and committee deference by offering 
amendments to committee bills on the floors and viewing more skeptically the decisions 
reached by the committees.”77 So, even the remaining moderate members must vote 
ideologically if they hope to rise in the committee or leadership structure. Under these 
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circumstances, it becomes nearly impossible for a moderate member to develop a 
moderate voting record unless he or she votes with one extreme sometimes and the other 
extreme other times. 
Other factors cited as contributing to party polarization include rising deficits and 
the rise of mandatory spending as a percentage of spending. Deficits put pressure on 
Congress to address the sources of the imbalance between spending and revenues, and a 
significant amount of that pressure falls on mandatory spending because it has risen to 
well over half of total federal spending. These factors increase conflict, degrade cross-
partisan rapport, and force the parties to entrench further and further in order to avoid 
outcomes averse to their respective agendas. Further, a wave of institutional reforms 
swept through Congress in the 1970s, including the War Powers Resolution and reforms 
to the committee structure. These reforms happened under a new group of young 
Democrats elected amidst tensions over Vietnam and Watergate. A slew of social issues 
was also creating rifts within the parties and reorganizing southern politics in particular. 
Jeffrey W. Ladewig argues that “members’ past electoral performance can influence their 
ideological extremity.”78 Keith Poole, Nolan McCarty, and Howard Rosenthal have 
explored several potential causes, one of the most prominent examples being their 
argument for the connection between economic inequality and party polarization.79 
Not only is the cause of partisanship still up for debate, but its virtue and value as 
a feature of American politics is, as well. What we see today as partisanship, political 
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scientists of the 1960s would have welcomed as clarity. As contemporary political 
analyst Michael Barone puts it, observers of the mid-20th century American political 
system wanted voters to have a “rational choice” between “one clearly liberal party and 
one clearly conservative party.”80 Some experts, such as former Congressman Van 
Hilleary, who served through the party warfare politics of the Gingrich speakership, 
argue that clear party divisions play a central role in lawmaking.81 Hilleary compares the 
institution of Congress to a courtroom, where we expect each side to present and 
highlight polarized views in the hope of reaching the best possible outcome.82 Journalist 
Matthew Yglesias contends that “the parties in American politics finally make sense in 
the contemporary, post-1964 era.”83 Back in 1885, Woodrow Wilson criticized the 
“committee government,”84 desiring instead a “coherent policymaking body reflective of 
strong party control.”85 Haskell echoes the sentiments of Wilson and mid-20th century 
observers, saying that presenting voters with “clear, principled choices” on key issues can 
be valuable and that a compromised decision is not always the best outcome.86 The 
downside, he argues, is that the current level of polarization fosters adverse relations 
between the parties, and that is “potentially disabling” because legislating “almost always 
requires accommodation and bipartisanship.”87 But general public sentiment is much 
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more negative. Budget scholars have also engaged in the debate over the value of distinct 
and separate parties. Wildavsky observed that, “although everybody agrees legislators 
should stand up and be counted”—and that is one intent of the concurrent budget 
resolution—“nobody agrees on what they ought to stand up for.”88 That, he said, is the 
main reason Congress is unable to budget on time. Wildavsky understood the difficulty of 
overcoming such political posturing on both sides, saying, “politicians will have to decide 
whether their capacity to govern is more important to them than their differing 
ideologies.”89 
The legislative process was by no means intended to be conflict-free, as Congress 
is supposed to be the forum through which we work out the many differences of opinion 
that characterize a democratic system. That original design did not involve a party 
system, but now that the parties have solidified around two fundamentally opposed views 
of the role of government, party polarization is here to stay. As political scientist Sarah 
Binder puts is, “Pears don’t unripen.”90 So, regardless of the intrinsic virtues or flaws of 
partisanship, it is a necessary area of study because of its effects of partisanship on 
legislative activity, its prevalence in the public consciousness, and its expected longevity. 
An ideal world might entail clear party lines without party warfare, but because we do not 
find ourselves under those circumstances and we cannot expect our current situation to 
change, discovering the nature and causes of the trend is our best recourse. 
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III. PARTY POLARIZATION AND BUDGETING 
Limited literature on party polarization and budgeting exists, but there is scholarly 
recognition that budgeting and party polarization are related and, though at less length, 
that the CBA and other movements toward controlled, comprehensive budgeting might 
have played a role in party polarization. The first concept to recognize in this body of 
literature is that budgeting is naturally divisive, regardless of the process. In Kettl’s 
words: 
…the budget is such a contentious issue because it is the one place in American 
government where almost everything of importance comes together… The battles 
between the president and the Congress, the squabbling between Democrats and 
Republicans, the campaign promises of budget balance that evaporate into higher 
taxes and spending—all are powerful symbols of a government struggling to 
resolve what often seem irresolvable problems. Worst of all, despite firm pledges 
and brave predictions, the budget deficit doesn’t seem to go away, and the 
national debt spirals ever upward.91 
 
Wildavsky argued that the parties must find a way to govern if they hope to survive in 
American politics.92 Each party risks being thrown out if it does not at least appear to 
seek to comply with the budget process. But recent large deficits are more than a symbol 
of dysfunction; they are the warning signs of an unsustainable budgetary structure. 
Failure to address the driving forces of the deficit—mainly Medicare and Social 
Security—before they reach insolvency in mere decades would mean catastrophe for one 
or both parties. Because the budget directly reflects national priorities, lawmakers have to 
attempt to ensure that deficit reduction legislation falls in line with their policy goals.  
Further, both parties are not only trying to pursue their policy priorities through the 
budget, but according to political scientists and congressional experts John Makin and 
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Norman Ornstein, both parties perceive an interest in appearing to be the party that wants 
to balance the budget. Kettl makes a similar point that the budget committees’ failure to 
meet annual deadlines is not so much a loss of congressional control as it is a predictable 
result of “the challenges of recurring large deficits, few easy answers, institutional battles 
with the White House over who controls the budgetary process, and fundamental 
struggles between the parties over who receives the credit—and more often the blame—
for budgetary decisions.”93 So, lawmakers seek credit for balancing the budget while 
avoiding giving up ground on policy. 
According to Theriault, the CBA and the budget process reforms of the 1980s 
forced Congress’s hand on “tough budgetary decisions…for the first time since the 
spendthrift 1960s.”94 This is the closest Theriault gets in his history of the political debate 
on the causes of political polarization to acknowledging the role of budget reform in party 
polarization. He also addresses the “breakdown of personal relationships,” which, he 
says, “coarsened the politics.”95 Increasing friction of budgetary matters, amplified by the 
weight of entitlements on the deficit, contributed to this tension and magnified the 
polarization. He also referenced the increasing complexity of issues and the rising 
presence of organized interests; these outside demands “forced changes and 
innovation.”96 But they also may have forced the parties further apart. The budgeting 
system Congress created in 1974 has made it so Congress has to look at the budget from 
an all or nothing standpoint. The nation is talking about the big questions—a goal of the 
CBA that has certainly been accomplished—but it cannot agree on the answers.  
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When the parties display inter-party division and intra-party unity, they 
characterize what Theriault calls party government. In cases of party government, the 
parties are ideologically separated, and the rank and file of each empowers its 
increasingly polarized leadership to enact its party’s agenda.97 John Aldrich suggests that 
the parties exist to serve the members, meaning that the parties are as strong as the 
members want them to be.98 Aldrich concludes that, today, it “serves individual 
congressmen to have high polarization. The invisible hands guiding these decisions, of 
course, are the members’ constituencies, which have also become more externally 
polarized.”99  
Wildavsky and LeLoup both approve of the CBA in the sense that it restored 
Congress’s role in budgeting. LeLoup praises is specifically because he says the use of 
“macrobudgeting” assists party leaders in passing their agenda over the head of an 
opposed president, establishing real legislative power in budgeting.100 Wildavsky’s views 
move past the institutional aspects of budgeting to the actual policy implications of 
institutional structure; he allows his frustration with the deterioration of “norms” 
regarding a reasonable size and scope of government to guide his recommendations for 
budgetary reform.101 But reforms that favor one ideological viewpoint are not very 
effective; as soon as the opposing party gained power, that reform would fall out of use.  
In a more explicit recognition of the relationship between comprehensive 
budgeting and partisan conflict, budget scholar Dennis Ippolito contends that the CBA 
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“revealed serious differences within Congress over whether and how to control 
deficits.”102 Ellwood similarly says the reforms succeeded in recapturing power from the 
executive branch but not in helping Congress comply with deadlines, manage internal 
conflicts, or impede deficit growth.103 On the contrary, he says, the reforms forced 
Congress backward, increasing conflict if anything.104 LeLoup takes a different focus, 
contending that macrobudgeting enhances party power. Kettl similarly contends that 
conflict is unavoidable, and “the closer we come to asking fundamental questions, the 
more controversy is likely to increase.”105 It is also, as LeLoup pointed out, highly 
sensitive to the inclinations of elected leaders and their desire to appease their 
constituents; Schick agrees that interest groups and voters are very sensitive to budgetary 
politics.106 Kettl argues, “As the structure of the budget has become less flexible, 
budgetary politics has tended to exacerbate the conflicts flowing from divided-party 
government, and the struggles between the parties have in turn worsened budgetary 
battles.”107 Ellwood agrees, asserting that abandoning “ad hoc” budgeting in favor of 
comprehensive budgeting might have led to enhanced national deliberation about the size 
of government, but that it leads away from consensus-building. Kettl takes this argument 
one step further, saying that, after the initial polarizing effects of asking more 
fundamental questions, “the answer to these battles in the end is not less but more 
partisanship.”108 In other words, at a certain point, more polarization is what will help us 
overcome gridlock over the budget. Schick agrees, stating that gridlock helps to restore 
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equilibrium in the budget process.109 The nation might be approaching that point today, 
but it has not yet built sufficient pressure to push past gridlock. 
According to Kettl, “To peel apart the layers of government budgeting…is to gain 
a keen insight into the most important issues of American politics: how elected officials 
and their institutions work through value conflicts and, ultimately, how American 
governments affect all of us.”110 Every important political decision contains a budgetary 
component. So it is no surprise that, as the stakes of budgeting have increased, so has 
party polarization. The question is what effect, if any, comprehensive budgeting and 
subsequent reforms had in either increasing party polarization or decreasing Congress’s 
ability to accommodate rising party polarization. Budgetary literature recognizes this 
relationship often, while party polarization literature largely overlooks it. Those who 
have sought explanations for party polarization have swept over the role of budgeting, 
and those who approach the subject from the perspective of budgeting have taken the 
relationship for granted. Budgeting is not alone in causing partisan polarization in 
Congress today, nor was it indispensable to that effect. But comprehensive budgeting has 
its own unique polarizing forces that have interacted with and fed into the many other 
factors at play in the sorting and polarization of the parties. 
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3 THE 1970S IN CONTEXT 
 
The CBA was one of many actions Congress took in the early 1970s to reclaim eroded 
powers and modernize the “ossified” elements of the institution.111 The policies and 
overreaches of the Nixon Administration had contributed to growing tensions between 
Congress and the executive branch. Public pressure for reform had been growing through 
the 1960s, leading to the election of a younger class of reform-minded Democrats in 
Congress. In the 1970s, the middle and low-ranking members of both chambers then 
became the driving force behind rules and procedure changes that permanently altered the 
institution—and therefore the members it attracted and policies it produced.112 The 
reforms that junior members advocated and implemented served their personal interests, 
helping them come out of the 1970s with significantly more power than they had when 
they came in.113 In the early part of the decade, Congress passed a series of legislative 
reforms that substantially altered the body’s internal power structure. Congress overrode 
Nixon’s veto of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which sought to restrict the 
president’s power to make war.114 Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971 (FECA) and the FECA Amendments of 1974 to limit and require disclosure of 
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campaign contributions and expenditures and to provide for partial public funding of 
presidential campaigns.115 Congress was able to find sufficient cross-partisan unity to 
override seven of President Nixon’s vetoes as well as a dozen of President Gerald 
Ford’s.116 But as the country went through the tumult of social change, the legislature 
experienced contentious debates that often did not split down party lines. Congressmen 
and commentators alike declared a crisis of ideological identity. But confused, 
disorganized conflict did not stop early 1970s lawmakers from permanently altering 
Congress and its role in American politics. 
 
I. SOCIAL CHANGE LEADS TO TURNOVER IN CONGRESS  
Today, the two major political parties have distinct and identifiable views on the role of 
government. But by the 1970s, previously clear ideological separations had become 
fractured. Poole and Rosenthal recognize that the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 and other civil rights legislation helped to fade persisting race-related, regional 
Civil War alignments.117 This factor was critical to the disappearance of the regional 
party line between the north and south, allowing race issues to largely codify around the 
shifting political parties. In this way, the social and cultural cleavages evolving in 1960s 
and 1970s helped to reveal the new ideological lines that would begin to characterize the 
party system.  
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From 1970 to 1975, Congress acquired large numbers of new members each 
election cycle; by the opening of the 95th Congress in 1977, 56 percent of House 
members and 48 senators had been elected for the first time since 1970.118 The new class 
engaged in the contentious policy discussions of the time, but they also had group 
interests and personal aspirations that impelled organizational reforms. Without a 
Democratic president to guide the party from 1969 to 1977, the new group of raucous, 
ambitious Democrats with plenty of ideas on how to modernize Congress and change it 
for their benefit would have the freedom “to pursue their own interests and assert their 
own priorities in office.”119 The actions that they took permanently altered the exercise of 
power in Congress.120  
 
II. INTERNAL CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS  
In-house reforms of Congress in the early 1970s included transparency measures and 
power restructuring. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 included two 
transparency reforms that would have a profound impact on legislative activity going 
forward. First, teller votes on the House floor would thenceforth be recorded, and second, 
roll call votes in committee would become public in an effort to make members 
accountable for their actions on the floor as well as in committee. Members would no 
longer be able to hope for anonymity on controversial votes. Further, by 1975, both 
chambers had opened committee meetings to the public for most bill draftings.121 
Conference committee proceedings, which were traditionally closed-door, also became 
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open to the public in 1975.122 According to CQ Press’s history of this time period, these 
transparency-oriented reforms “swept away the dark procedural corners in Congress in 
which members could hide their actions from the public and press.”123 Together, 
committee reorganization and transparency reforms meant individual members had more 
power, but members were increasingly expected to use that power to enact a party 
agenda.  
With a large class of new members pushing for reform and power, Congress 
significantly altered the power dynamics in Congress in the early 1970s. Unhappy with 
the dominance of senior committee chairmen, junior members helped pass reforms to 
strip committee chairs of their unquestioned power by subjecting them to votes by the 
party caucus.124 According to Theriault, party members began giving more power to the 
party leadership “in exchange for assuming more responsibility for their parties’ fortunes 
in both the legislative and electoral arenas.”125 The Subcommittee Bill of Rights, 
composed by the Democratic Caucus, also expanded the power of individual members. It 
had the greatest impact on junior members, who had no chance at a chairmanship in the 
previously seniority-dominated process. It ensured the creation of subcommittees and 
promised good subcommittee assignments for more junior members.126 The House 
evicted three chairmen from their posts at the start of 1975, and that, “more than any 
other event, signaled top-ranking committee members that they would be held 
accountable to their colleagues for their actions and had to be solicitous of those 
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colleagues if they were to win and hold chairmanships.”127 But while junior members had 
gained subcommittee chairmanships and heightened individual power, especially in the 
Senate, they had also limited their autonomy. The same reforms that gave power to rank-
and-file members made them beholden to the leadership for prominent committee 
appointments and chairmanships. The leadership had gained power to persuade members 
to vote with the party. These reforms therefore decentralized power from entrenched 
senior members to more new members on subcommittees at the same time that it 
centralized power in the party leadership.  
 
III. CONGRESSIONAL RECLAMATION OF POWER FROM THE EXECUTIVE  
There was also a growing sense of unrest in the halls of Congress with regard to the 
status of legislative power in American politics. Congress therefore passed reforms in the 
1970s to reclaim power from the executive branch in both domestic policy and foreign 
policy. Prior to the Watergate scandal, Congress had been fairly hands-off with regard to 
Nixon’s actions, adopting a “wait-and-see” approach early in Nixon’s presidency, 
“reflecting a widespread feeling that the new administration should be given time to work 
out its policies.”128 Public opposition to the war, the main policy issue at the time, was 
not the predominant view in Congress, but the few resistant voices were growing 
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louder.129 Congress showed its mounting discontent with the war with three funding bills 
that carried war-limiting measures: a supplemental appropriations bill eliminated funding 
for operations in Southeast Asia (HR 11400—PL 91-47), a Defense Procurement 
Authorization bill placed a funding ceiling on U.S. support in Vietnam (S 2546—PL 91-
121), and an amendment in the defense appropriations bill prohibited funding of troops in 
Laos or Thailand (HR 15090—PL 91-171).130 But in 1973, the 93rd Congress became 
much more active in moving to reclaim lost congressional power. The War Powers 
Resolution of 1973, passed over President Nixon’s veto, sent a loud message about the 
Vietnam War and presidential war powers in general by restricting executive power to 
make war. In 1974, Congress responded to Watergate by passing extensive reforms to the 
Federal Election Campaign Act, setting limits on campaign expenditures and offering a 
public funding option.131 The CBA also falls into this category: the CBA curtailed the 
president’s ability to impound funds and reestablished legislative dominance in the 
congressional budget process by requiring a comprehensive legislative budget each year 
and providing the necessary resources for budgetary independence. 
Congress was open to working with President Gerald Ford at first, but after Ford 
pardoned Nixon, Congress grew cold towards the new president. In Ford’s term alone, 
Congress overrode four of twelve vetoes, more in one year than any Congress since 
1948.132 This string of overrides took an almost unprecedented show of cooperation and 
common goals in Congress.133 For a brief time in history, both parties were fighting the 
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executive branch together.134 But this camaraderie did not extend to policy. The post-
World War II Congress experienced disputes over McCarthyism, highly charged civil 
rights debates (including filibusters in opposition to equality for African Americans), and 
disagreements about the role of the federal government in education and the ability of the 
president to force his agenda through Congress.135 Members quarreled over a 
comprehensive energy bill, tax cuts and comprehensive tax reform, an independent 
consumer protection agency, and national health insurance.136 The Democrats held an 
average majority of 258.5 in the House from 1969 to 1977.137 Their advantage should 
have made it easy enough for them to pass a substantial substantive policy agenda, but 
they were dealing with their own internal quarrels. Average party unity for the Democrats 
in the same time period was 72.9 percent, compared to 93.5 percent today.138 (Southern 
Democrats demonstrated less than 50 percent unity as a separate group.139) Over 70 
percent unity does not seem as though it would be debilitating to a party strategy, but 
72.9 percent of 258.5 members is only 188.4 votes—29.6 votes short of a majority. So, 
on an average vote in which the Democrats might have enjoyed 188 votes from their 
party, they would require 30 Republican votes for passage. They could not expect to rely 
on their full rank and file like parties can today. The Democratic majority in the early 
1970s did succeed in passing parts of its agenda, including a minimum wage hike, a 
temporary expansion of elementary and secondary school aid, a mass transit bill, and an 
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extension of unemployment compensation eligibility.140 But these wins were hard-fought 
and required Republican defections. 
Political scientist Nelson W. Polsby argues that changes in the makeup of the 
House created the necessary circumstances for the institutional reform that would 
follow.141 Generally, organizational reforms weakened committee chairmen, in turn 
strengthening party leadership, and checks on the executive simultaneously elevated 
legislative power in general. To relate the effects of the 1970s reforms back to the process 
of party polarization, the increasing internal homogeneity of the parties feeds into the 
willingness of the rank and file to cede power to their leaders, further equipping 
leadership with the power to control the legislative agenda and entice party loyalty. 
Today, party leaders use their control over campaign resources, committee assignments, 
and the legislative agenda (for the majority party) to enforce loyalty to their agenda 
among the rank and file, but they also have an obligation to please the rank and file.142 As 
the relationship between these two new, dominant tiers of congressional power grew 
steadier, party polarization continued to rise. Party leadership was on the rise in Congress 
just as Congress was on the rise in American politics—all in the early stages of a divisive 
and polarizing time in U.S. history.  
 
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT 
The CBA contained both elements of reform: modernizing Congress’s internal structure 
and reclaiming power from the executive. According to Kettl, the CBA was one piece of 
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the broader effort to “set a new balance between the branches.”143 Ellwood argues that 
the CBA was “the great exception” in the broader trend of decentralization in Congress 
since the 1970s reforms.144 In the midst of the decline of the party organizations, 
committee power, and the seniority system, and the rise of “subcommittee government” 
and “autonomous legislators,” the CBA “centralized and integrated” budgetary and 
economic decision making, Ellwood says.145 But the institutions and procedures that the 
CBA established were not separate from the broader changes going on in the 1970s (and 
tracing back into the 1960s). As Kettl says, “All political issues, sooner or later, become 
budgetary issues … [and] all budgetary decisions are inevitably about politics.”146 In 
other words, without public funding, public policy is an abstraction. The social concerns 
of the public during this time period, which were trickling through Congress, would 
necessarily become budget items, and almost all of them would become points of 
contention in the new budget process. 
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4 COMPREHENSIVE BUDGETING: POLARIZING FORCES 
  
Slow and deliberative by design, with an ungainly size and cumbersome bicameral 
structure, Congress is naturally disadvantaged in the act of budgeting. The 93rd Congress 
sought to remedy that disadvantage by providing a coordinated structure for the 
consideration of budget decisions. The 1974 budget reforms are a small piece of a much 
larger system of political actors and influences. CBA procedures have been at play during 
the elimination of the deficit and during phenomenal deficit growth and have guided the 
allocation of federal funding in times of booming economic expansion and harsh 
recession. The role of Congress in budgeting has changed and its power fluctuated over 
the years, as has the role of the budget committees in Congress. The formation of the 
concurrent budget resolution has occurred in the committee, in the leadership, in the Oval 
Office, and not at all. The CBA budget timeline is, in many ways, optional; it is a guiding 
framework that Congress can and often does choose not to follow. But whether the 
concurrent budget resolution is the center of policy-making, a procedural tool, a 
deliberative forum, a party weapon, or simply a symbol of a budgetary ideal—and it has 
been all of these things—it is the process Congress has chosen through which to fund the 
government, providing the set of budgetary procedures and tools at lawmakers’ disposal. 
Today, the key leaders in the budget process find themselves in a highly polarized 
political environment with a nearly $17 trillion problem to fix and a fundamental 
question about the role of government to answer. Recent stalemate has seemingly left 
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domestic politics frozen in time as two opposed parties battle for dominance, leaving 
pundits, lawmakers, and the public anxious, wondering where the nation goes from here. 
The story of how the current situation came to be from the perspective of budgetary 
politics might provide some answers.  
 
I. THE HISTORY AND AIMS OF THE 1974 BUDGET REFORMS 
The U.S. Constitution confers on Congress the “power of the purse,” meaning all federal 
spending, collecting, and borrowing rely on legislative action. Congress has the power 
“to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States,” and no money can leave 
the Treasury except “in consequence of Appropriations made by law.” But, as with most 
of its endowments of power, the Constitution does not specify how the relevant person or 
body should go about performing these powers. As the responsibilities of budgeting have 
grown, Congress has at various times centralized or decentralized the budget process. 
Under current budget procedures, defined in the CBA and subsequent reforms, Congress 
possesses the staff and proper mechanisms with which to examine the full federal budget 
and evaluate competing funding priorities.  
For much of its history, Congress collected and appropriated funds in a disjointed 
and ad hoc manner. Spending and revenue considerations were consolidated in one 
committee in each chamber (the Ways and Means Committee in the House and the 
Finance Committee in the Senate) up until the Civil War because the level of spending, 
multiplicity of budget items, and complexity of the tax code were not demanding to 
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manage; customs revenues were typically sufficient to pay for the federal government.147 
But Civil War expenses prompted the addition of the appropriations committees, 
separating revenues from spending to reduce the workload of the two original 
committees. Appropriations decisions decentralized in the latter half of the 19th century, 
as authorization committees usurped control. In the analysis of the Joint Study 
Committee on Budget Control, whose work in 1973 led to the CBA, this decentralization 
“meant there was no way at the congressional level for making a choice among 
competing expenditure programs.”148 The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (BAA) 
restored some unity to the congressional budget process by reestablishing the power of 
the appropriations committees. But more important to this analysis, the BAA 
significantly altered the relationship between the legislative and executive branches, 
allowing budgetary power to centralize in the executive branch. 
In response to the cost of World War I, Congress sought to modernize its 
budgeting practices by centralizing and delegating authority. The temporary House Select 
Committee on the Budget, tasked with determining the appropriate reforms, stated that it 
sought “not what was theoretically desirable, but rather to determine what was practically 
feasible [and]…in complete harmony with our constitutional form of government.”149 
Congress determined that the executive branch would be better equipped to manage the 
fragmented decision making that budgeting required. The primary function of the final 
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legislation was the delegation of authority to the president. The BAA required an annual 
executive budget proposal and provided an executive budget staff, the Bureau of the 
Budget (the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) today). Prior to the BAA, 
according to Ellwood, the “aggregate effects of the many decisions made at multiple 
levels were rarely understood and almost never explicitly debated except in reaction to 
presidential initiatives.”150 The desire to remedy the lack of understanding of budget 
aggregates and to enhance budgetary coordination impelled Congress to relinquish “much 
of the power of the purse.”151 The executive budget provided a starting point for 
congressional negotiations and recentralized the power of appropriations, but 
fragmentation still existed on the congressional side. First, Congress typically considered 
appropriations bills separately on the floor, so Congress as a whole was still not paying 
attention to budget aggregates. Second, the rise of mandatory spending after the passage 
of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, which created Medicare and Medicaid, 
further contributed to the fragmentation of spending control in Congress.152  
The Select Committee was true to its statement that it sought practicality; the 
surrendering of authority to the president placed increasingly complex budgetary 
responsibilities in the hands of a branch intended to function hierarchically, with one 
definitive decision maker. But in pursuing practicality, Congress had given the president 
a powerful instrument: the ability to present an annual budget plan expressing his view of 
the proper size and shape of government. This power elevated him in the process, even 
though Congress retained procedural power over spending and revenue legislation. But 
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the Congress in power half a century later would seek to reassert the legislative role in 
budgeting with the CBA.  
The 93rd Congress (1973 – 1974) believed that President Richard Nixon was 
overstepping his authority on the latter end of the budget process by impounding 
appropriated funds, or disregarding enacted appropriation levels. Congressional Research 
Service scholar Louis Fisher characterized the aftermath of impoundment as a 
“monumental confrontation between the two branches.”153 In the broader congressional 
culture of the 1970s, the CBA was part of Congress’s kneejerk response to President 
Nixon’s oversteps, including his actions in the Watergate Scandal, Vietnam, and the 
impoundment of appropriated funds, as well as to growing tension between the two 
branches in general. Both impoundment control and the coordination of budgetary 
decision making within Congress were part of this response. According to a Government 
Printing Office document detailing the history of congressional budget legislation, the 
goals of the CBA were: 
…to establish a congressional budget process for the determination of national 
budget priorities, the appropriate level of total revenues, expenditures and debt for 
each year, and for legislation review of impoundments proposed by the President. 
The Act created new instrumentalities to serve Congress: Budget Committees in 
the Senate and House and a Congressional Budget Office. The Act gives the 
committees three major assignments: (1) to report the concurrent resolutions on 
the budget each year, and reconciliation bills when appropriate (2) to study the 
effects of existing and proposed legislation on the budget, and (3) to oversee the 
operations of the Congressional Budget Office.154  
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The “impoundment” part of the legislation sought to directly curtail presidential action. It 
banned impoundment and instituted in its place a “rescission” option under which a 
president may request Congress’s approval to not spend money that Congress has 
appropriated.155 It also allowed the president to defer spending until the end of the fiscal 
year, but even then the president had to confer with Congress.156  But the reforms to the 
congressional side of budgetary procedure were equally important to reclaiming the 
power of the purse. The Joint Study Committee on Budget Control convened in 1973 to 
explore and recommend options for reform. Addressing the inter-branch dynamic, the 
Study Committee stated that Congress must “develop ways of making its own decisions 
on budget priorities so that realistic control over the purse can be regained by the 
Congress, as intended by the Constitution.”157 The Study Committee’s arguments in 
support of the reform emphasized preventing further fragmentation of budgetary control 
and “improving Congressional control of budgetary outlay and receipt totals, including 
procedures for establishing and maintaining an overall view of each year’s budgetary 
outlays which is fully coordinated with an overall view of the anticipated revenues for 
that year.”158 Similarly, a 1973 House Rules Committee report stated that “the legislative 
budget machinery is in disrepair… The excessive fragmentation of the budget process in 
Congress makes it difficult for Congress to effectively assess program priorities or to 
establish overall budget policy.”159 In general, the Study Committee’s stated guiding 
principles appeared to seek a process of congressional deliberation, consensus-building, 
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and control regarding the size and shape of government by remedying the fragmentation 
and lack of coordination between congressional budget decisions. 
Although many other motivations have been offered, political professionals and 
experts today are adamant that reclaiming congressional control was the primary goal of 
the CBA. As Kettl observes, before the passage of the CBA, the annual budget “was little 
more than the accumulation of decisions recommended by individual committees.”160 
Even those decisions were influenced heavily by the executive budget.161 According to 
Kettl, before the creation of the budget committees, Congress was unable to evaluate 
overall spending and revenue levels or “examine how different spending programs fit into 
the nation’s overall priorities, or to weigh the relative advantages of increasing some 
programs more than others.”162 With the creation of the budget committees, the 
endowment of the concurrent resolution with enforcement power, and the establishment 
of CBO as a staffing arm, the CBA gave Congress the institutional capacity for 
independence in the act of budgeting.163 While the CBA’s major revisions to the timeline 
and institutions of the congressional budget process did not explicitly diminish 
presidential authority, they diminished the influence of the executive budget by allowing 
Congress to rely on its own sources of information.164 Congress established itself as an 
independent voice in budgeting while coordinating the evaluation of budget totals and 
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priorities.165 The CBA sought to coordinate Congress’s disparate voices into one while 
strengthening congressional intentionality regarding the budget. 
The Joint Study Committee also asserted that deficit reduction was a goal of the 
reform, perhaps seeking to broaden the appeal of the final legislation. The Committee 
conveyed a belief that the annual development of a limitation on budget authority in the 
concurrent budget resolution would help Congress establish “control…over future growth 
(as a result of the budget authority limitation).”166 But the budget committees have since 
embraced the goal of deficit reduction; today, the websites of the majority side of the 
House and Senate budget committees both cite deficit reduction as a primary goal.167 
Further, every substantial budget process reform since the CBA has been explicitly—and 
arguably primarily—geared toward deficit reduction. So, it is important to consider the 
CBA and the concept of comprehensive congressional budgeting in the context of deficit 
reduction as well as in the context of an institutional reclamation of power. 
Assembling a comprehensive budget plan, with or without deficit reduction in 
mind, is much more different in Congress than in the executive branch. Congress was 
aware of its challenges in comprehensive budgeting, as it had tried a quarter-century 
earlier to implement a legislative budget. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 
(LRA 1946) established a Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget for that purpose. 
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The Committee’s first attempt in 1947 failed.168 Congress passed a legislative budget but 
exceeded the limits in 1948, and it failed to pass one again in 1949, even after extending 
the deadline by a month and a half.169 That was the last attempt. The comprehensive 
budgeting attempt of the LRA 1946 was very different from that of the CBA. First, the 
Joint Committee lacked budgetary information and sufficient staffing despite the 
increases in overall congressional staffing levels in the LRA 1946.170 Second, the Joint 
Committee had a hard time reconciling the views of its roughly 100 members.171 Third, 
perhaps as a result of insufficient staffing and information, the Joint Committee 
continued to use the president’s budget as a starting point. Further, the attempt may have 
failed because it was a “difficult political climate with sharp disagreement over budget 
policies,” and Congress lacked the motivation to reclaim budgetary power from the 
president.172 In the 1970s, on the other hand the motivation to reestablish balance with the 
executive was much stronger. Despite these differences, the LRA 1946 was an indication 
that comprehensive budgeting and party polarization do not mix well. In 1950, Congress 
made a different attempt at comprehensive budgeting; the Appropriations Committee 
reported a single omnibus bill as a “one-time experiment in improving legislative 
efficiency.”173 According to Polsby, the exercise succeeded in “dramatizing the sheer size 
of the federal budget.” 174 Even in the 1950s, it was apparent that putting the entire federal 
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budget into one bill had dramatic effects. Apparently unhappy with the experiment, 
Congress returned to reporting thirteen separate bills the next year.  
The concurrent budget resolution is essentially a single consolidated omnibus bill 
each year, with the added complexity of including revenues and facing much higher 
levels of mandatory spending. Congress had a historical experience to draw on that 
indicated that it would find comprehensive budgeting difficult. Time had likely clouded 
its memory, but perhaps lawmakers really thought they had ironed out the problems by 
separating the committees into each chamber, making their membership smaller, and 
giving members more power and resources. Or perhaps the spirit behind restoring 
congressional control was strong enough in the 1970s to give the budget committees the 
teeth they needed to become part of congressional and budgetary culture. In any event, 
the legislation would have many unintended and unforeseen consequences. 
 
II. THE POLARIZING FORCES OF THE 1974 BUDGET REFORMS 
In such a disjointed and diverse body as Congress, differing viewpoints on the purpose 
and goals of the budget process are inevitable. Even if most members can agree that the 
goal of the process is to represent the will of the public, fulfilling that goal necessitates an 
annual fight among 535 representatives elected by very different segments of the public. 
But a critical part of retaking budgetary power from the president was to complete the 
same comprehensive task that the president completed each year: creating a blueprint for 
the size and shape of government. That task placed polarizing pressure on Congress for 
five main reasons. 
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First, the CBA helped sort members into rational, ideologically congruous groups 
because it confronted them with a fundamental decision about the role of government. 
This effect entails both the sorting out and diverging of the parties over the past four 
decades. With regard to partisan sorting, macrobudgeting placed the policy debate into 
the public sphere and before the leadership in an easily digestible form: Did the member 
vote for the budget that increased the size of government or the one that decreased it? 
Members have a personal interest in voting the “correct” way; if a Democrat votes for the 
latter option, he risks losing his committee assignments or losing funding from the 
national party organization during the next election. But having to make a public 
declaration about budget aggregates and national priorities also helped the parties connect 
new social issues to the budget and identify with one side of the evolving party structure. 
The easiest way to conceptualize this concept is through the following diagram. 
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Inspired by an example Theriault used to explain polarization on the up-or-down vote on 
Clinton’s impeachment, this diagram illustrates that when Congress encounters a yes-or-
no, A-or-B style of decision, it necessarily ends up with a vote that looks extreme. The 
vote will hide any amount of gradation between the poles, and it will have forced 
lawmakers to “pick a side.” In legislating, picking a side is typically necessary. But in 
comprehensive budgeting, picking a side means making a decision—a public decision, 
because of the LRA of 1970—about the proper size and shape of government. Of course, 
the reality is much more complicated. Budget proposals do not always reflect one party’s 
agenda as heavily as this diagram suggests. Further, the content of the concurrent budget 
resolution is discussed lengthily in committee and in conference before the final floor 
vote, allowing plenty of opportunity for gradation to enter the process. But the reported 
bill tends to carry the stamp of approval from one side of the aisle or one ideology of 
budgeting more heavily than the other, forcing an ideological vote. Perhaps more 
importantly, though, the process of deciding on trade-offs and budget aggregates 
inevitably forces lawmakers to debate national priorities (the shape of government) and 
appropriate levels of spending, revenue, and debt (the size of government), which add up 
to a debate over the fundamental role of government in society. That conversation, with 
the whole budget on the line, is quite helpful for getting a confused party system back in 
order. 
Prior to the 1974 budget reforms, the budget process fit the disjointed 
incrementalist model of decision making, a behavioral model that stems from Charles 
Lindblom’s work; in this model, key actors tend to make decisions and conduct 
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supporting research and analysis “disjointedly at multiple points and levels.”175 Between 
the Civil War and the CBA, when legislation came to the floor, whether it was 
authorization, spending, or appropriations legislation, members generally considered the 
individual merits of the legislation instead of considering it in the context of the overall 
system of government. The fragmentation of information and decision making forced 
actors to restrict themselves to “analyzing a few consequences of a limited number of 
options, rather than analyzing all the consequences of all the options.”176 That style of 
decision making was in accordance with the disjointed incrementalist model.177 
Following the model, the pre-1974 budget process had become so disjointed that 
authorizers were unaware of the corresponding funding levels.178 (This lack of 
communication was becoming problematic considering rising deficits.) In order to fund 
the government on time, budgeters had to restrict their focus to marginal changes from 
current levels of spending (or from the president’s budget proposal) rather than 
undertaking a comprehensive review of the budget.179 In Lindblom’s theory, if 
lawmakers under the incrementalist model encounter a problem, they address pieces of it 
rather than seeking a “single comprehensive solution.”180 Their work is necessarily 
focused on avoiding negative outcomes rather than moving “toward a set of goals.”181 
Similarly, when congressional budgeting has several nuclei of decision making and 
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provides for limited conversation between each nucleus, then the process as a whole 
cannot seek a distinct set of goals. When budget formation is disjointed, each piece seeks 
its best outcome, but lawmakers are not fully engaged in a debate over the proper size 
and scope of government. 
The disjointed incrementalist model differs from classical economics and rational 
planning models, in which decision makers weigh all factors in search of a stated goal 
and select the solution that best fits that goal. With the requirement of a comprehensive 
legislative budget, Congress created the institutions necessary to bring all components of 
budgeting into conversation and engage in a process that more closely resembled rational 
planning models of decision making. The idea was that improving coordination in 
congressional budgeting would help elevate Congress in the budget process and restore 
the balance of power. But rational planning models require a stated goal in order to be 
effective; the process of determining that goal is where Congress runs into trouble. 
Lawmakers do not agree on what they are moving towards, let alone how to get there. 
The CBA forced Congress to have that conversation, and the disparate body soon 
organized around two fundamental opinions on the role of government; Congress would 
soon find that the rational planning model works equally poorly in reconciling two 
distinct goals as it does for hundreds.  
Reaching budget and economic decisions through a fragmented and ad hoc 
process (pre-1974) allowed for partisan mutual adjustment, which Lindblom describes as 
“the process that allows rational actors with different values to achieve ad hoc 
accommodations without changing those values.”182 As noted above, Ellwood says the 
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pre-1974 process “limited the extent and scope of political conflict.”183 Comprehensive 
budgeting, on the other hand, invited that conflict by institutionalizing the link between 
spending, revenues, programmatic legislation, ideology, and party identification. The 
CBA required congressional deliberation over the proper shape of a unified budget, 
making it impossible for members to hide their ideological preferences. Before the CBA, 
Congress contained Democrats in the South who acted as conservatives and Republicans 
in the Northeast who acted as liberals, and that system was largely non-ideological.184 
Therefore, budgeting in aggregate highlighted the ideological stakes and helped 
lawmakers (and voters, who began voting to replace members who were not ideological 
enough) attach their ideology to a party. Before the ideological sorting, some Democrats 
would expose themselves to electoral backlash by voting with their party. Afterwards, it 
became clear which side members aligned with ideologically. 
Again, in a democratic system, there are many different opinions on what the 
“stated goal” of budgeting should be, making rational actor behavior quite impossible and 
even irrational in a naturally conflicted and decentralized body with no clear leader. 
Haskell points out that Congress cannot plan as a single entity “because it is not actually 
a single entity.” (Emphasis supplied.)185 The Founders intended Congress to experience 
such disagreement about goals, as the legislative body represents a diverse nation. But 
two opposed goals organized into a clearer two-party system, conflict increasingly fell 
along party lines, and those parties became stronger and more entrenched. The strength of 
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the party system began to feed back into the differentiating forces of comprehensive 
budgeting. 
The second polarizing force behind the CBA is that comprehensive budgeting 
works against the institutional nature of Congress. The Founding Fathers did not try to 
establish efficiency in Congress, but rather they sought a system that would produce good 
policy and protect against power abuses.186 As part of that goal, the Founders created two 
institutionally different chambers of Congress that produce different types of 
representatives. The inability for those two chambers to reconcile—let alone for their 
many members to compromise—becomes an often insurmountable blockade to the vast 
majority of proposed legislation. Haskell notes that “the fundamental nature of Congress” 
as defined in the Constitution has changed very little over more than 200 years.187 The 
institution, he says, referring to the work of James L. Sundquist, is slow, parochial, and 
unable to plan.188 The CBA attempts to address all of these limitations; it places a 
timeline on budgeting, lessens the influence of local interests by creating a whole-of-
government approach, and provides for multiyear budget planning. But, with the 
exception of its treatment of parochialism, it does this by imposing demands on the 
institution rather than working with it. A comprehensive approach also creates more work 
and tougher decisions, putting strain on Congress’s sluggishness and inability to plan 
rather than enhancing efficiency. Congress also made its job harder by using its own 
information source, the CBO, rather than relying on the president’s budget as a starting 
point. Starting from scratch provides less political cover in Congress, raising the level of 
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blame each party would have to seek to avoid. The CBA reclaimed a power that belonged 
in Congress, and addressing budget totals in some way (and certainly creating a 
legislative budget staff) may have been necessary to that end. But in practice, the CBA’s 
implementation of comprehensive budgeting attempted to capture the ocean with a net. 
Congress hoped to manage an unmanageable institution—to mold its own unchangeable 
features. The hierarchical executive branch responds well to the centralization of decision 
making, and the CBA assumed, or hoped, that Congress could adapt to centralization 
with the same effectiveness. According to Fisher, that assumption was a fundamental 
misunderstanding the institution’s nature.189 
Two interrelated phenomena are important to note: the shift from disjointed 
budgeting to comprehensive budgeting and the shift from executive-directed budgeting to 
legislative-directed budgeting. Congress ends up with heightened pressure on its slow and 
disparate nature as well as heightened power and responsibility. With more blame to go 
around, each individual member is more averse to making votes that might upset his 
party or his constituents. The same time period also brought increased frequency of 
divided government. Six of the nineteen Congresses in the 38 years prior to the 93rd 
Congress, which passed the CBA, experienced divided government, in which the 
executive and at least one chamber of the legislature are different parties. In the nineteen 
Congresses after the CBA, thirteen of them experienced divided government. Not one of 
the nineteen Congresses before the 93rd Congress experienced a divided Congress, 
compared to four (plus one evenly divided Senate) afterwards.190 LeLoup argues that 
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divided government can provide “political cover” for controversial decisions on issues 
such as tax hikes and cuts to mandatory spending programs.191 According to his 
argument, the notable increase in the frequency of divided government after the 1970s 
should have alleviated the polarizing effects of the CBA and party polarization in general. 
But the equalization of power, as Kettl and Haskell argue, is a polarizing force. Kettl 
makes the argument with regard to the power balance between the branches, saying the 
budget process changes that reestablished the institutional balance of power “have 
multiplied the opportunities for conflict.”192 Haskell makes the argument with regard to 
the establishment of balance between the political parties. Divided government might 
provide political cover if the parties chose to engage or if the branches were unequal in 
power. But the parties are relatively equal in power, and the CBA helped to ensure that 
the branches were, as well. Thus, neither party will be inclined to give up ground, 
although the opportunity might be available.  
Congress has made other attempts at reforming itself from within as well as at 
seeking solutions and assistance from outside the institution. These reforms have 
typically “coped with, or tried to compensate for, its inherent limitations in order to 
maintain its relevance in a changing world.”193 As it did with the BAA, Congress has at 
times recognized its limitations and chosen “flexible approaches to pressing issues.”194 
This is not to say that the BAA was a “better” reform than the CBA. The CBA 
exacerbated Congress’s limitations, while the BAA relinquished power that may have 
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belonged in the legislative branch; both choices had unintended consequences and 
potentially negative policy outcomes. The CBA reforms worked in the direction of 
rigidity and coordination; that choice had a much different impact on the institution. 
Third, comprehensive budgeting procedures gave the appearance of heightening 
budgetary control and providing sufficient incentives to compromise without helping 
Congress accomplish those tasks. Recall that Theriault praised these reforms briefly for 
forcing Congress to make tough decisions.195 But, while comprehensive budgeting did 
succeed in making them talk about tough issues, it did not actually succeed in forcing 
them to make those tough decisions. Fisher posits that the post-1974 budget process has 
encouraged deficit growth while dampening the political will needed to address them.196 
The result? A conflict-ridden process with little to show for it. With fiscal issues entering 
the national consciousness through rising deficits, the CBA helped reassure the public 
that Congress was working on addressing the problem by creating, according to Ellwood, 
“new procedures and institutions that reflected a more centralized and integrated 
decisionmaking process than previously had been used to make economic and budget 
policy.”197 Fisher contends that Congress even reassured itself that its new budget process 
would help stem the growth of deficits; he says the architects of the legislation assumed 
that members “would behave more responsibly if they had to vote explicitly on budget 
aggregates and face up to totals, rather than vote piecemeal on a series of appropriations 
and legislative bills.”198 But Congress has almost always struggled to address deficits and 
to budget on time since 1974—two indicators of lack of budgetary control. Former 
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Director of the CBO Rudolph Penner commented that the post-1974 system is not just 
passively ineffective; rather, he says that it “looks very elegant on paper, but it is leading 
to very dishonest and disorderly results”—a process that intended to fix problems or 
disorder and provide enhanced coordination.199 Perhaps another reason that the CBA in 
practice did not work as intended in this regard involves the role of special interests and 
the public in the new budget process. 
With the rise of public information and the proliferation of interest groups, the 
response to legislative activity is rapid and intense. In a budget process that has the 
potential for sudden, far-reaching change, the stakes are even higher. With regard to 
budgeting, there is always more public outcry over what not to cut than there are ideas for 
what to cut.200 These natural inclinations of the public and interest groups clash with a 
budget process that necessitates offsetting one program for another. In a budgetary 
environment that is all about what to cut, the interest group community is on edge.201 The 
proliferation of interest groups bent on keeping programs leads to increased fighting over 
scarce resources and can “make societies ungovernable.”202 With the threat of instant 
interest group mobilization and the instant public pressure that effective interest groups 
carry, members are increasingly bound to their platforms and parties.203 
In one incident that Jonathan Rauch notes in his commentary on interest groups 
and democracy, “Demosclerosis,” a group of “kamikaze Senators” produced an 
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alternative budget that focused on reducing entitlement spending (though even they were 
smart enough to the leave immensely popular Social Security untouched for the better 
chance of passing reform elsewhere).204 The story goes: 
“Within two hours of the four Senators’ first detailed discussion of their proposal,  
[the ‘kamikaze Senators’] were receiving telegrams, [Senator Pete] Domenici told 
the Senate, ‘from all over the country, saying that this is going to hurt a veterans' 
group, this is going to hurt people on welfare, this is going to hurt seniors on 
medicare.’ ‘We were inundated,’ G. William Hoagland, the Senate Budget 
Committee's Republican staff director, recalled during a recent interview. ‘Just 
about every interest group you can think of was strongly opposed. It was very 
dramatic how quickly they all came to the defense.’” 205  
 
Senators with constituents who would be affected by the cuts responded by moving 
amendments to exclude specific groups one by one. The kamikaze Senators withdrew 
their bill. This anecdote illustrates one effect of a comprehensive budget process: all eyes 
are centered on it—on the creation of one resolution that controls appropriations and has 
the power to alter mandatory programs and taxes—and each lawmaker in Congress is 
bound to represent a different set of eyes.  
Another effect is that comprehensive budgeting becomes impossible and begins to 
weigh on the other steps of the budget process, as we have seen in the past few years 
especially. The old system also had trouble passing budget items on time: of the eight 
years that preceded the CBA, four did not see one appropriations bill before the 
beginning of the fiscal year, and it took Congress an average of three months after the 
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start of the fiscal year for Congress to complete action on all thirteen appropriations 
bills.206 But Congress typically resolved the conflict on an annual basis, whereas, from 
FY1977 to FY2011 Congress enacted all regular appropriations bills on time in only four 
years (FY1977, FY1989, FY1995, and FY1997).207 Lawmakers learn to anticipate this 
frenzied response to cuts, and Congress becomes averse to touching the funding that 
politically powerful interest groups care about. If Congress did not operate in a system of 
comprehensive budgeting today, the nation would probably still be in a situation with 
high deficits; that situation would demand trade-offs, and evaluating those trade-offs 
would require some form of comprehensive budget review. Congress would still be 
partisan and polarized, so budgeting would often be contentious. But presidential 
involvement would certainly be much heavier, so the disparate interests of Congress 
would not be as central to the process. Further, lawmakers would have more flexibility to 
report piecemeal budget legislation separately from the context of the overall budget, 
when politically expedient, helping to disperse attention and conflict. Interest group 
proliferation and public information did not exist in full force until after the CBA. Their 
rise meant that the CBA found itself in a system that was unsuitable to its structure, 
adding to the hostility of the institution. The modern budget process magnified the 
polarization that was already there, and the increasingly public nature of conducting 
legislative business in turn magnified the effect of the modern budget process.  
Deficits are both a result of lack of decision making and a cause of it. Kettl 
wonders why policymakers did not “simply not buckle down” and make the necessary 
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tough decisions earlier on to “ease” the country out of deficits.208 He partially answers his 
own question by saying that deficits themselves contribute to the difficulty of budgeting. 
But a related and critical answer is that “easing” out of anything on a whole-of-
government scale is nearly impossible, and it got harder as the deficit rose, interest 
groups dug in their heels, and the parties became more distinct and separate. 
Unfortunately, the parties’ “untouchable” issues (protection against tax increases vs. 
protection of entitlements) are diametrically opposed while having the same effect: they 
both put pressure on the deficit. The larger the deficit gets, the more difficult it will be to 
implement reform on a whole-of-government scale. More interest groups’ programs will 
be at stake, and public scrutiny will continue to rise, raising the potential for electoral 
consequences.  
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The graph above shows the shocking trajectory of deficits over the past decade.209 Two 
consequences result from rising conflict in an ill-equipped budgetary system. First, if we 
assume that the process will take care of the tough decisions for us, it becomes difficult to 
foster the political will to work through our most fundamental problems. (Congress has, 
multiple times, attempted to place procedural reforms on top of the CBA in the hope of 
compelling deficit reduction.) Second, if the political environment is such that 
fundamentally opposed views cannot be accommodated or one of them subjugated, our 
problems similarly remain unsolved. Comprehensive budgeting makes accommodation 
more difficult, and increasingly balanced power between the parties (and the branches) 
has made it impossible for either side to completely disregard the other side’s needs. 
These two factors, complacency and competition, are the two devils of budgeting. They 
have existed in budgeting in various degrees since the passage of the CBA, and they have 
also been enhanced by subsequent reforms. Today’s budgetary environment does not give 
the impression of complacency, but look more closely: in the summer of 2011, Congress 
gave itself a year and a half to come up with $1.5 trillion in deficit reduction on top of 
over $1 trillion in discretionary spending caps over ten years.210 In the many months 
leading up to the sequestration deadline, the process stagnated and conflict festered as 
lawmakers, apparently resigned to the impassable divide between them, went through the 
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motions of the Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction (organized to find the $1.5 trillion). 
Kettl identifies deficits as a “handy club” for beating opponents (although Republicans 
find themselves in a better bargaining position during deficits).211 In negotiations, both 
sides did just that, using the deficit to argue a) drastic cuts, or b) embrace new revenues. 
Leading up to the sequestration deadline, both sides prepared themselves to win the 
“blame game” if they failed. Both sides were well aware that they could allow the 
sequestration deadline to pass as long as their arsenal was ready with talking points about 
how they tried, and the other side obstructed. 
The concurrent budget resolution created a similar situation, though less 
dramatically so. Even though the concurrent budget resolution is statutorily required, 
there is no punishment for failure to produce a concurrent budget resolution. So, the idea 
that members would vote “more responsibly if they had to…face up to totals” is largely 
unfounded because lawmakers quickly discovered that they did not have to; when 
politically expedient, they could use the process as part of their arsenal without being 
concerned about ensuring the passage of a compromised resolution.212 Congress must 
fund the government, but it can do so through regular appropriations bills, continuing 
resolutions, and omnibus and minibus bills without a budget resolution. Thus, the CBA’s 
intention of producing compromise often fails because of another fundamental 
misunderstanding of Congress: it does not have to follow its own rules. 
The Joint Study Committee had stated its belief that the fragmented institutions 
and structure of the pre-1974 process had contributed to deficits by failing to make trade-
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offs.213 It also stated that history had proven the futility of nonbinding spending caps 
“which could be ignored at will” in requiring an assessment of “competing priorities.”214 
In other words, if budgeters can break the spending caps at will, the caps are useless. The 
Committee therefore recognized Congress’s tendency to ignore its own rules when those 
rules become difficult to follow. (Recall that Congress also had a handful of previous 
experiences with budget aggregates to draw from.) Since the framers of the legislation 
were aware of Congress’s frequent disregard for its own rules, it is curious that they did 
not express concern that Congress might at times be unable to produce a budget 
resolution in the first place—or that one party or chamber might choose not to participate 
for political reasons. The Study Committee therefore did not anticipate the consequences 
of requiring a budget resolution and failing to pass one on time or at all. Remember, by 
the time Congress started missing budget resolutions for full fiscal years, in 1999, the 
parties had already sorted out to a large degree, and conflict over unsolved problems has 
been festering for decades. 
There is no method of punishment for Congress if it does not follow the laws it 
sets for itself, save electoral or other political punishment. Lawmakers’ zeal for 
reclaiming budgetary power from the president gave the process motivation at the outset, 
and the usefulness of the budget resolution as a majority party tool has helped to continue 
the practice, whereas before Congress was content to make many fragmented decisions 
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and take little notice of their relationship to each other in the broader context of the 
budget. But while both sides typically participate in discussions over the budget 
resolution, they know that the political consequences of ceding ground on policy 
priorities can be much worse than failing to compromise. Both parties are quite 
concerned with deficits as a policy issue in themselves (if for no other reason, because 
their constituents are concerned with deficits), but a deficit solution favorable to the party 
agenda takes precedence over deficit reduction for its own sake. Instead, in accordance 
with Haskell’s assessment that half of partisanship is the effort to score points against 
adversaries, lawmakers prefer to extend the policy battle and win the blame game in what 
Fisher calls the “politics of blamesmanship.”215  
The concurrent budget resolution still manages to hold up the appropriations 
process, despite its effective “optional” status. While missed appropriations deadlines 
were by no means unheard of before 1974, Congress completed one and a half of the 
required twelve appropriations bills on time from 1997 to 2008. This impediment to the 
existing pre-1974 budget structures has consequences. Congress has only fully completed 
its work on the budget twice, for fiscal years 1977 and 1989.216 Save for a handful of 
other years, conflict has forced Congress to rely on a series of continuing resolutions.217 
Some years, that meant going full years on continuing resolutions.218 In doing so, 
Congress loses the big picture assessment that the concurrent budget resolution is 
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supposed to provide and, again, gets only the conflict-inducing aspects of comprehensive 
budgeting without the desired rationality and solution-building.  
That the power of political interests trumps the rules of process is a popular stance 
among congressional experts. The maxim is that procedural reforms cannot force political 
will. Congress has often fallen into the temptation to try to force political action with 
rigid reforms, but historically, friction and polarization result from such reforms more 
often than solutions. A reform that seeks solutions by increasing the demands of the 
process without increasing the potency of the “controls” creates more difficult decisions 
without much incentive for Congress to comply with them. Gradation is more difficult to 
show or attain, so each side and each member has more to lose politically. Again, cross-
partisan rapport degrades, and the rift widens. 
Fourth, the budget committees quickly lost power to the leadership, who were 
able to use budgeting to further unite and strengthen the parties. Part of the reason for the 
fall of the budget committees’ power was that other reforms in the 1970s demoted the 
committee structure. The same Congress that was unhappy with the committee-centric 
structure that characterized Congress in the early 1970s built a budget process that relied 
heavily on its power. The budget committees fell in power along with the rest of the 
committees as the leadership rose. Kettl notes that those who advocate for reforms 
typically stand to benefit from them. More specifically, as Theriault explains, not only 
did the whole of Congress stand to gain by reasserting itself in the budget process in 
1974, but individual congressmen stood to gain from ceding power to the leadership 
around the same time. Although lawmakers did not anticipate that they would be ceding 
even more power to the leadership with the CBA, Ellwood says the centralization of 
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power and elevation of the leadership was an unintended consequence of the 1974 budget 
reforms.219 Whether by separate forces or by the budget process reforms, leadership’s 
accumulation of power at the same time as the rise of legislative budgetary prowess had 
significant implications for the implementation of the CBA. 
But the loss of power is also partially the fault of the committees themselves, or, 
at least, of their inability to cope with what was asked of them under the pressures of an 
increasingly partisan political environment. Not only is the budget committees’ 
complacency over deadlines problematic for reasons discussed above, but increasing 
failure to meet deadlines also weakens the committees themselves.220 With increased 
need for high-level budget summits, budgetary decision making started centralizing in the 
leadership, and the budget committees became increasingly procedural and after-the-
fact.221 Kettl echoes this analysis: “The more Congress relies on continuing resolutions to 
keep government operating, and the more budget summits…produce the real decisions, 
the more the budget committees fade from importance.”222 The original structure of the 
CBA allowed for some gradation to enter into the process through committee mark-up 
and conference, but a leadership-dominated process cuts that step out. In years when 
budget summits control negotiations, lawmakers really do end up with a yes or no choice. 
Wherever the decision making happens, the deal still has to funnel through the 
budget committees to become binding spending levels and reconciliation instructions. 
Further, what comes out of the budget committees still has to come to a floor vote. So, no 
matter where the locus of decision making lies, the final goal of passing a comprehensive 
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budget through Congress has to remain a crucial factor. The party agendas thus take the 
lead in budgeting, and as each side’s leadership seeks to both please and manage its rank 
and file, there is no longer any room for conciliatory trade-offs and bargains between 
individual members.  
Finally, the reestablishment of the balance of power through the implementation 
of comprehensive budgeting contributed to party polarization. By establishing legislative 
power over the budget—the central goal of the CBA—the new budget process invited 
partisanship and the clash of ideals. The legislative budget element of the CBA does not 
impede presidential action in budgeting, but it did have “the general effect of obscuring 
and weakening presidential responsibility,” according to Fisher.223  Still, the president 
retained meaningful budgetary power after the 1974 reforms, including the rhetorical 
power of a unitary executive in driving public opinion, the political power to drive his 
party’s agenda, and the institutional power to veto final spending and revenue bills. These 
powers are natural and central to the presidency. They have helped keep the president 
relatively on par with the legislative branch in budgetary activities, despite the success of 
the CBA in that regard. Kettl describes how Congress was soon able to feel the effects of 
balanced power and more equal budgetary tools between Congress and the president:  
“…the balance of power between the institutions became more even, just as 
budgetary decisions became ever more intractable… The 1974 congressional 
budget act thus proved critical for evening the balance between the president and 
Congress on budgetary issues… If not perfect, the balance was at least more even. 
As it became more even and neither the Congress nor the president were able 
consistently to dominate the process, however, passing any budget at all became 
harder.”224 
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The reestablishment of institutional balance of power also helped to balance the political 
parties, and, according to Haskell, the same conclusion applies: a party with no hope of 
passing its agenda will tend to be more complacent and open to compromise, he says, 
while two parties that are relatively equal in power will prefer compromise.225 Kettl goes 
on to say that the budget process deteriorated just as “partisan clashes” became more 
common.226 But the CBA also allows the president to avert budgetary responsibility when 
he finds it expedient, leaving Congress to battle internally with the full weight of decision 
making and therefore the full weight of public opinion on the line. (The balance of power 
is still critical, as the president will typically only step aside if his party has enough 
power in Congress to be able to obstruct policy gains by the other side.) Reagan 
employed this tactic for much of his presidency, staying involved in budgeting from a 
rhetorical standpoint by expressing opposition to tax increases and defense cuts but 
allowing the responsibility of budgeting and, eventually, deficit control, to shift to the 
legislative branch. Prior to the CBA, Schick says, “Members were able to profess support 
for the president’s objectives while ‘nickel and diming’ the budget in their action on 
appropriations and other spending measures.”227 Afterwards, lawmakers lost the 
protection of hiding behind the president’s budget, and they have to struggle though 
producing their own comprehensive budget—a much more difficult task. 
Mandatory spending also helped along each of these factors. Remember that 
mandatory spending is not actually mandatory—the choice of how to spend the people’s 
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money still lies with Congress.228 “Mandatory” simply indicates that the levels of 
spending are statutory and not subject to annual appropriations. Therefore, these budget 
lines would not be subject to annual oversight if not for the existence of the budget 
committees, which have the power to recommend statutory revisions to authorization 
committees through reconciliation as long as there is a budgetary effect. Despite the 
budget committees’ power in this regard, the growth of entitlement programs and the 
decision to index them to inflation has placed an increasing portion of the budget on 
“autopilot,” reducing resources available for discretionary budgets.229 Mandatory 
spending programs are now hurtling towards insolvency; estimates place Medicare at 
insolvency by 2024.230 The graph below shows the relationship between mandatory 
spending and discretionary spending over time as percentages of total outlays.231 
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Entitlements have gone without meaningful reform for many of the reasons already 
discussed. But the pressures of mandatory spending would have impacted partisan sorting 
and polarization without the CBA by giving Congress a sense of the challenges of 
comprehensive budgeting; by the time the CBA passed, mandatory spending was already 
forcing Congress to consider revenues and expenditures in tandem. Ellwood notes that, 
even with the relatively small portion of the budget dedicated to mandatory spending in 
the 1970s, pressure to control its growth was already creating conflict among 
appropriations, authorization, and revenue committee, and Congress was already having 
difficulty with internal conflict.232 The CBA imparted that style of decision making, 
along with the conflict it carries with it, on all of Congress’s budgetary decisions and 
placed mandatory spending in more visibly direct competition with the rest of the budget. 
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Further, the interest groups attached to mandatory spending programs such as Medicare 
and Social Security are among the strongest lobbies in American politics. The resulting 
difficulty of controlling and reforming mandatory spending programs seems like all the 
more reason to have a congressional body that recognizes and seeks to grapple with the 
budget as a whole and then seeks to present an option for how to reconcile priorities and 
funding for the next year. Even though the CBA’s primary goal was to reclaim power, the 
budget control aspect of comprehensive budgeting makes sense in hindsight. But again, 
in practice, it only helped us to discuss the tough issues, not to solve them. 
The above factors have also contributed to the widening of the gulf between the 
parties because they all, to varying degrees, harm cross-partisan relations, damaging 
ability and desire to reach compromise. Kettl says gridlock has stemmed from tensions 
between the executive and legislative branches, “partisan squabbles,” and from the 
simple lack of an “easy answer.”233 Confronting members with a fundamental decision 
about the role of government and disallowing them from making accommodations means 
they have fewer opportunities to engage in such deal making, and they will be less 
inclined to do so. The increasingly public nature of budgeting raises the stakes, and 
higher stakes mean more conflict; the threat of electoral punishment is much higher when 
votes and arguments are on the national stage. Shifting power to the leadership creates an 
institutional and partisan fight between the president and the party in power in Congress. 
The increased balance of power between the parties leads to less relinquishment of 
ground on party priorities. 
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Haskell says partisanship has the ability “to undermine [Congress’s] ability to 
conduct its basic responsibilities,” and the public today believes it has had this effect.234 
A January 2013 Gallup poll found that 87 percent of Republicans, 68 percent of 
Democrats, and 79 percent of independents think that “the way politics works” today is 
harmful.235 Similarly, an April 2013 Gallup poll found that Americans are more critical 
of the parties for their “approach” than for “substance.”236 As the parties have aligned on 
substance and diverged from each other, politics has begun to supersede substantive 
policy debates, and the public is unhappy with that development. Theriault argues that the 
“divide between the political parties in Congress can increasingly be characterized as a 
disagreement about procedures.”237 When members start disagreeing on procedure, they 
signal that they are divided on strict, enforced party lines, not just on policy. According to 
an interview with Budget Committee Minority Chief of Staff Marcus Peacock, the 
controlled release of budget proposal bill language by leadership is one procedural tactic 
that leads to bad blood and discourages future cooperation.238 Theriault concludes that the 
various factors feed each other: “The more control major parties assert on the agenda, the 
more the legislative process exacerbates party polarization.”239 This effect is especially 
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noticeable in a system of comprehensive budgeting, in which each party stands to lose 
ground on several issues that are central to the party’s existence in American politics. 
A few things are important to keep in perspective in closing this chapter and 
starting to explore the post-1974 budget reforms. First, democracy is a system that is 
intended to celebrate the benefits of conflict. As Kettl reminds us, “Spending issues have 
for centuries been the central focus of conflict between executives and legislators,” and 
our system of government “envisions conflict as the critical element in preventing the 
abuse of power.”240 But recent conflicts have been debilitating, and recent deficit issues 
and the forces underlying them have been played a major role in partisan deadlock. 
Second, the electorate is the main driver of what goes on in Washington. Lawmakers act 
based on their anticipation of constituent reactions. Today, lawmakers are organized into 
distinct parties that act as giant interest groups, attempting to reconcile and meet the 
needs of as many constituents of the group as possible. Finally, the CBA has contributed 
to polarization only because of how individual leaders have utilized and reacted to the 
CBA. The broad influence of this reform on the role of government and the level of 
partisanship is an amalgamation of a large combination of judgments and decisions on 
the part of hundreds of representatives—and their constituents—over nearly 40 years. 
Looking at a few key institutional reactions to the CBA and the problems the budget 
presented over the next few decades is the next step to understanding the impact of the 
comprehensive budgeting on the American political system. 
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5 COMPREHENSIVE BUDGETING IN PRACTICE AND 
SUBSEQUENT REFORMS: 1980 – PRESENT  
 
In the mid- to late 1970s, the nation was developing an ideological self-awareness—
embodied through the party system—that had not existed since the Civil War. 
Demographic shifts and broader cultural issues, primarily centered on civil liberties, had 
been brewing since the 1960s, revealing new coalitions and cleavages that did not match 
the existing party structure. Evolving social issues altered the political landscape and 
turned into new divisions over policy. Without necessarily being fully aware of the extent 
of party reorganization that had begun, Congress claimed its role in the ensuing debate 
over the role of government by implementing the CBA, thereby reasserting its role in the 
budget process and creating a forum through which to advance its view of the role of 
government. But as Congress would soon find out, an often fierce internal battle must 
precede the budget resolution. In response to unsatisfactory results with the budget 
process under the CBA, Congress has passed several subsequent reforms, some of which 
build on the principles of the CBA and some of which divert from them. 
Congress in the 1970s was aware of impending decisions on deficit control, and it 
certainly wanted a role in those decisions, as the CBA’s primary goal was to reclaim 
congressional power in budgeting. So, just as the cultural shock waves of the civil rights 
movement, Watergate, and the Vietnam War reverberated through the country and new 
rifts arose, deficits were on the rise. At that moment, Congress passed legislation 
requiring the annual development of an overarching budgetary framework, forcing 
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Congress and, therefore, the nation, to confront the debate over the role of government. 
The broader changes of the 1960s almost certainly would have proven strong enough to 
revise party lines on their own. But in politics, nothing is so strong an incentive as 
money—particularly, the distribution of a limited supply of money. So, nothing is as 
strong a catalyst for conflict creation and coalition-building—and political parties are the 
largest coalitions in American politics. Putting all of that money in one pot and weighing 
budget items against each other seems to be the only logical thing to do when 
government spending cannot keep up with revenues—but it also seems to be a recipe for 
party-line conflict in Washington. The application of the CBA in practice, as well as 
further budgetary reforms that either built on or diverted from the principles of the CBA, 
are crucial to understanding the role of comprehensive budgeting in party polarization. 
In the first two years under CBA procedures, Congress passed the budget 
resolutions fairly easily; FY1976 and FY1977 remain two of only six years in which 
Congress has met the entirety of the budget process on schedule.241 Deficits for FY1976 
and FY1977, however, came to $73.7 billion and $53.7 billion in current dollars, 
respectively—the largest deficits on record besides a $54 billion deficit during WWII.242 
Going into the 1980s, Republicans found themselves with an unexpectedly strong role in 
the new budget process, as they had taken control of the Senate and placed an ally in the 
White House. Further, fiscal conservatives have always had an easier time arguing for 
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limited government in times of budgetary crisis; the GOP thus had the ticket to a unifying 
party message if it hoped to become the party of fiscal conservatives: the deficit.  
 
I. GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS AND THE FIRST BUDGET SUMMITS  
Congress attempted several budget reform and deficit control measures from 1985 to 
2002 while functioning under the basic structures and institutions of the CBA. According 
to the CBO, these measures “sought to supplement and modify the existing budget 
process, and also added statutory budget controls.”243 The string of reforms started with 
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, better known as 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH).244 GRH set statutory deficit limits in response to 
massive deficits in the early 1980s and established sequestration, or across-the-board 
spending cuts, as the enforcement mechanism.245 The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 
1990 contained the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), which replaced the ineffective GRH 
deficit limits with 1) discretionary spending caps and 2) the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rule 
for entitlements and taxes, whereby all increases in mandatory spending or decreases in 
revenues had to be offset, or “paid for,” with decreases in mandatory spending or 
increases in revenue elsewhere in the budget. BEA numbers were also subject to 
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sequestration. The 2010 debt ceiling increase included a modified version of PAYGO. 
Finally, the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) reestablished caps on discretionary 
spending and created the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, tasked with 
reducing the federal deficit by $1.5 trillion over ten years.246  
By 1985, federal budget deficits had climbed to $212 billion.247 Stalemate 
between Congress and the executive had led to the development of “a statutory 
framework to force political action.”248 The legislation that resulted was GRH. The 
House approved the GRH conference report 271 – 154, and the Senate approved it 61 – 
31.249 The legislation’s sponsors were Senators Phil Gramm (R-TX), Warren Rudman (R-
NH), and Ernest Hollings (D-SC). GRH largely amplified and reinforced the principles 
behind the CBA. As such, it had similar effects. Continued partisan conflict and 
budgeting trouble were unsurprising results for five main reasons, four of them directly 
building on the polarizing effects of the CBA. First, GRH built on the ideological sorting 
of partisans because it confronted lawmakers with the question of the fundamental role of 
government within tight deficit targets. Not only did GRH reinforce the pressures of 
comprehensive budgeting, but it sought to determine a key factor of budgeting that the 
CBA had left to the budget committees: the appropriate level of debt considering the 
political and economic environment of the time. That factor gave lawmakers less 
flexibility on future budgetary decisions and created more pressure on lawmakers to 
debate the relative importance of government programs. Further, once deficit reduction is 
set in law, members have no choice but to stake out a clear position on whether it fits 
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their vision of government to address deficits with spending cuts (limit the role of 
government) or with tax increases (expand the role of government). 
Second, GRH built on the institutional misunderstandings of the CBA. Instead of 
changing tactics and reevaluating its own strengths and weaknesses as an institution, 
Congress adhered to the assumptions inherent in the CBA. The added rigidity of deficit 
caps was an attempt to “fix” Congress’s slow nature and inability to plan by motivating it 
to perform as a coordinated body capable of moving towards a stated goal. As discussed 
earlier, Congress is not intended to move towards a specific goal, as the Founders 
designed it to be deliberative, collegial, and cumbersome rather than hierarchical and 
efficient. The added parameter of deficit reduction with GRH set part of that goal for 
Congress—the size of the deficit each year for several years—but the reform did not 
alleviate difficulty. It did not provide an answer to the question of the size and shape of 
government that the next several budgets would produce; requiring a certain level of 
deficit does not specify the level of GDP at which Congress should balance the budget, 
nor does it solve for Congress the question of which competing priorities would be 
subject to cuts or where new revenues would come from. Instead, GRH helped split 
Congress and the nation into two opposing camps with regard to what constituted 
responsible budgeting. The architects of the CBA expected that forcing members to “face 
up” to budget aggregates would encourage more “responsible” budgeting.250 That 
misunderstanding leads to the third reason. 
Third, and most importantly, GRH gave the appearance of heightening budgetary 
control and providing sufficient incentives to compromise without actually 
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accomplishing either of these tasks. While GRH altered the federal budget process 
created by the CBA in some ways, it advanced the 1974 legislation’s primary budgeting 
tactics: review the entirety of the budget, determine a framework, and enforce that 
framework. But under GRH, that framework had to meet specific deficit targets, and the 
enforcement mechanism became stronger—sequestration if Congress failed to meet its 
mark instead of points of order on the House and Senate floor.251 The main idea behind 
the legislation in the eyes of primary architects Gramm and Rudman was that Congress 
could not control itself without severely limited options and strict external controls.252 
The architects of GRH expected that placing statutory deficit requirements on top of the 
comprehensive budget requirement would force Congress to budget responsibly when the 
CBA had not. In purely procedural terms and lacking any language that actually reduced 
the deficit, the legislation required the gradual elimination of the deficit by 1991.253 In the 
1980s, the parties’ messages had become stronger. At that critical point, neither one was 
interested in sacrificing its political foundation for deficits.254 But deficits had become an 
issue of their own. So, Congress implemented a “gun behind the door” approach. 
Sequestration, which the Congressional Research Service defines as “the cancellation of 
spending by executive order,” would go into effect as the enforcement mechanism if 
Congress did not meet its deficit targets in any given year.255 The sequester cuts were to 
be split evenly between domestic discretionary spending and defense spending.256 Large 
direct spending programs such as Social Security, Medicare, various welfare programs, 
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and interest on the debt were exempt, even though mandatory spending had grown to 
42.4 percent of total outlays from 26.9 percent in 1965 (the first year Medicare was 
administered, and the year right before mandatory spending climbed drastically as a share 
of total outlays).257 Therefore, cuts to domestic programs would be drastic in the case of 
sequestration. Neither party wanted thought that outcome to be wise or good policy, so 
lawmakers should have been able to compromise instead of accepting an outcome they 
knew was poor governance. In this way, GRH enhanced the false sense of order and 
security that came with the CBA, further diminishing genuine efforts to address the 
deficit. But the added pressure was insufficient to force action and instead only added to 
growing partisan conflict.  
GRH not only sought comprehensive budgetary evaluation—it sought to control 
the timeline of comprehensive budgetary change. To the extent that deficit reduction was 
a stated goal of the CBA, deliberating the relative merits of funding priorities had been 
unsuccessful at moving towards that goal. GRH attempted to use across-the-board cuts as 
a way around deliberation. In that sense, GRH was an attempt at what some scholars have 
called “magic bullet” reforms. To Wildavsky, GRH showed that a “deliberately 
unintelligent” budget that made sweeping cuts to discretionary programs, precluded 
revenues as a partial solution, and spared entitlements and other selected programs was 
all lawmakers were capable of agreeing on. 258 Congress is not subject to punishment if it 
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does not follow the laws it sets for itself, save electoral or other political forms of 
punishment.  
GRH symbolized Congress’s acknowledgment that the CBA was unable to cope 
with early 1980s-level deficits.259 It also revealed a partial recognition on the part of 
Congress that internal self-control mechanisms are insufficient. What Congress had yet 
to realize was that external deficit control or what Yale law professor calls an 
“extralegislative mechanism” (in this case, the threat of executive sequestration) does not 
work, either.260 GRH protected roughly 70 percent of the budget from sequestration, 
therefore subjecting just 30 percent to potentially very deep cuts.261 This restriction 
should have created sufficient motivation—but sequestration remained an empty threat. 
Institutionally, Congress has just as much power to unbind itself as it has to bind itself; as 
we saw again in the spring of 2013, sequestration continually proves itself no more potent 
in producing deficit reduction than points of order. In Stith’s words, “As the threat of 
sequestration becomes greater, the plausibility of the threat decreases because Congress 
can always repeal, amend, or suspend GRH.”262 Lawmakers put sequestration in place as 
a “gun behind the door,” thinking it would force action since they all disliked the idea of 
across-the-board cuts. But, just like the “requirement” of a budget resolution, 
sequestration was not really a gun behind the door because noncompliance held no real 
consequences—Congress could change the rules of the game at any time, and the 
members were well aware of their power to do so. They did just that with the Balanced 
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Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987 (GRH II), which 
softened the original GRH target and sought to eliminate the deficit in 1993 instead of 
1991, partially to allow the deferral of tough decisions to after the critical 1988 election 
and partially because attention had been diverted to sorting out constitutionality issues 
with the first GRH attempt.263  
According to Fisher, GRH “has been far more effective in sowing confusion and 
deception than in controlling budget deficits.”264 Lawmakers used tricks to defer decision 
making by manipulating the deficit targets in GRH, producing false “savings,” or 
continually shifting deadlines down the road.265 LeLoup argues that a main part of the 
reason GRH failed was because, without the tool of multiyear projections, “Congress 
could simply shift additional spending or revenue-losing measures to future years.”266 
LeLoup is noticing is that lawmakers’ knowledge that they could change the rules of the 
game largely nullified the usefulness of the deficit reduction timeline and the incentive 
effect of sequestration, which was supposed to provide the incentive that the CBA lacked. 
In American politics, the next election is always more important than long-term policy 
planning. To have a hope of impacting long-term policy planning, a lawmaker must first 
ensure his reelection. That reality of electoral politics is precisely the reason that both 
internal and external controls have been insufficient to control the federal budget process. 
While it seems logical to conduct a comprehensive review of a rapidly growing 
budget, compromise has no chance when decision makers fundamentally disagree over 
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what the federal budget should accomplish. Lawmakers know very well that the political 
consequences of ceding ground on policy priorities can be much worse than failing to 
compromise. They prefer to extend the battle and win the “blame game.” Especially for 
Republicans with regard to GRH, winning the deficit battle means they lose their best 
political bargaining chip; Haskell says “winning a legislative battle is not always good 
politics” because the party might lose a “useful issue” for the next election.267 Legislative 
activity often ends up paralyzed under such circumstances, with the parties unable to 
compromise and comply with the statutory requirements but bound to go through the 
motions if they hope to be able to claim political victory. The added pressure of deficit 
controls simply created more frantic interest group activity and therefore more public 
mobilization. Polarized rhetoric sailed through the media, contributing to the electoral 
partisanship that is the basis for congressional partisanship. Going back to the basic 
directional forces of party polarization, recall that members either shift to more extreme 
positions to satisfy voters (adaptation), or voters simply oust their current representatives 
in favor of more extreme members (replacement). Either way, electoral concerns are 
central if a member wishes not to be replaced, and lawmakers must tailor budgetary 
rhetoric and decisions to that reality.  
Fourth, the pressure of GRH and the increasing frequency of continuing 
resolutions prompted the first “budget summits” between the president and legislative 
leaders. These summits further elevated leadership’s power but because of the legislative 
emphasis of GRH, the summits did not allow Congress to cede much responsibility to the 
president. The budget committees took a back seat in constructing the budgetary 
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framework with which they were tasked.268 Congressional party leadership, which began 
to rise in power in the 1970s as a result of other changes and reforms, began to step in on 
budgetary policy in the latter half of the 1980s. Comprehensive budgeting did not come 
easily to a disjointed body, and the inability of the budget committees to lead left a power 
vacuum that leadership—after steadily gaining power since the legislative reforms of the 
1970s—began to fill. The benefit of budget summits is that they provide some political 
cover because both parties are at the table. But at the 1987 budget summit, facing the 
pressure of the revised GRH automatic cuts, leaders still avoided the most controversial 
choices. Many of the rank and file had hoped that the recent economic crash might 
encourage compromise, but upon learning the terms of the deal, lawmakers viewed the 
summit as a lost “opportunity to make real changes in the budget … the sense of urgency 
generated by the crash had quickly dissipated into politics as usual.”269 It was not an 
exciting or inspiring budget, and the rank and file members on both sides were furious 
that their negotiators had given up too much ground.270 Surprisingly, both chambers went 
along with the summits’ decisions in 1988 and passed a concurrent resolution without 
incident.271 But as the deal ignored the driving forces of the debt, it failed to help keep the 
government on track toward the deficit targets. Leadership’s power had grown in place of 
that of the budget committees, contributing to the expectation and enforcement of party 
unity. Upset as rank-and-file lawmakers were, they were happy to allow the leadership to 
keep the burden of responsibility.  
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Unlike the CBA, GRH raised the political stakes of budgeting by making an 
explicit promise regarding deficit reduction, heightening the difficulty of comprehensive 
budgeting. This factor largely contributed to the distancing of the parties. Placing a 
deficit reduction requirement—a performance gauge, as far as the public was 
concerned—on budget negotiations and votes made it politically difficult for either party 
to cede ground. The deficit caps also made it very strategically necessary for both sides to 
engage in criticism and finger-pointing when Congress fell short of its goals. For partisan 
lawmakers, missing a deficit cap deadline is not defeat, but giving up a key policy 
platform could mean political ruin or a major setback for the party. Ensuring the other 
party takes the fall in the public eye is thus much more important than complying with 
deficit targets. A party might then declare political victory without a single policy 
advance or substantive compromise. That political success trumps policy success is a 
core element of the American political system, and GRH was so difficult to comply with 
that lawmakers were constantly concerned with political success.  
Many experts have observed that the shrinking of the portion of the budget that is 
subject to annual review each year has an amplifying effect on partisan conflict in 
budgeting. Recall the earlier graph that showed the rising share of outlays that go to 
mandatory spending. Such rigidity rarely serves the budget process well. Schick argues 
that entitlements impede the budget process’s ability to self-correct.272 Specifically, if 
Congress is seeking a path towards deficit reduction, the rise of mandatory spending 
makes that task markedly more difficult. According to Kettl, the joint effect of deficits 
and budget rigidity (referring to the growth of entitlements) during the 1980s “made the 
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game all the more dangerous. The possibilities for missteps multiplied as the room for 
maneuvering shrank.”273 GRH shrunk the room for maneuvering even further by 
requiring that deficit reduction occur on a specific timeframe. In doing so, GRH may 
have ensured the opposite. As long as entitlement reform stayed off the negotiating table 
and out of the path of sequestration, lawmakers had limited options from which to make 
the required cuts, resulting in more conflict and fewer results. 
Again, all of these factors contribute to degrading rapport across the aisle, priming 
the 1990s for an unprecedented rise in partisanship. After all this, deficits climbed again 
in the early 1990s. If sequestration would have gone into effect, defense programs would 
have faced a 34.7 percent cut, and non-defense programs would have faced a 31.6 percent 
cut ($41.7 billion from each).274 Experts later argued that deficit reduction had actually 
decreased as a result of GRH.275 Partisanship was also on a steep climb moving into the 
1990s, with party unity growing by 6.5 percent from 1990 to 1993—3.7 times its growth 
in the previous six years combined, but not an unprecedented growth, as party unity grew 
7 percent from 1978 to 1981.276 But the 1980s did not experience the same party 
distancing that the 1990s experienced.277 Further, perhaps as a result of increasing 
partisanship, multiple disappointing deficit reduction attempts, or psychological 
distancing from the recession of the early 1980s, the political will to reach deficit targets 
was softening.278 
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II. THE BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1990 
Despite these factors, President George H. W. Bush’s first budget summit concluded in 
the fall of 1990 with a $500 billion deficit reduction plan. The deal met staunch and 
active opposition in Congress, rather than grumbling acceptance like the 1987 budget 
summit deal, indicating increasing pressure on leaders to please the rank and file. The 
BEA agreed on even lower targets than GRH II had sought, but with a new tactic: 
spending caps instead of deficit targets. The BEA also created a “pay-as-you-go” 
(PAYGO) rule, meaning tax cuts or mandatory spending increases must be offset or “paid 
for” by one or a group of mandatory spending cuts or tax increases, in an effort to control 
new legislation that would further expand mandatory spending. The BEA made budget 
resolution and reconciliation bill totals binding over a period of five years, subject to a 
“mini-sequester” within a category of spending that breached the spending caps.279 
According to LeLoup, the BEA created a genuine increase in enforcement capacity in 
congressional budgeting institutions, as opposed to the false sense of security that GRH 
provided. He argues that the BEA succeeded where GRH failed by applying PAYGO 
rules to revenue bills and entitlement spending changes, including changes in entitlement 
eligibility. The only protected programs under the BEA were emergency spending and 
Social Security, whose surpluses remained locked behind a “firewall.”280 Schick agrees, 
saying that GRH was valuable in the sense that it led to the less rigid BEA.  
The BEA was less closely based than was GRH on the CBA’s conflict-inducing 
tendencies. The main provision of the BEA, spending caps, proved far less conflict-
inducing than deficit targets (in general, preventing program expansion is much easier 
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politically than cutting existing funding). Instead of seeking to force future deficit 
reduction, the string of BEA legislation sought to protect the deficit reduction in the 
reconciliation instructions that accompanied the budget.281 The second provision of the 
BEA, PAYGO, proved effective at preventing new mandatory spending growth and 
preventing tax cuts. The BEA also revised and extended the deficit targets and 
sequestration threats from GRH, but the new spending caps, if adhered to, would keep 
Congress well within the deficit targets.282 The importance of the budget committees 
continued to decline during the 1990s; the growing frequency of budget summits 
rendered the committees—which were created to fulfill the primary function of the 
congressional budget process—largely irrelevant for many years. But the influence of the 
CBA and the subsequent pressure of the GRH reforms remained strong.  
The solidification of a new role for party leaders in budgeting became very 
important in the late 1980s and moving into the 1990s. The 1993 budget summit 
produced the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which continued the 
framework of the BEA. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1997 then revised and prolonged 
the spending caps until 2002. The deficit actually started heading in the right direction. 
But in between these two events, budgetary conflict was so high that the government shut 
down—twice. In 1994, a Republican majority gained the House for the first time in 
twenty years, on the promise of implementing the deficit-cutting promises of the Contract 
with America. Newly elected Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich “led a strategy of 
GOP confrontation with Clinton” that today is often charged with the gridlock that 
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characterized the 1990s to the extent that it led to a government shutdown.283 But the 
legislation was brazen and politically infeasible, and by virtue of signing a “contract,” the 
new lawmakers had bound themselves to stick to its terms. Partisanship feeds back into 
the budget process and jams up the gears. The real problem arose when the GOP 
demanded extensive entitlement and other non-defense cuts in the 1996 budget. The 
president clearly retained importance in budgeting because of his power to veto spending 
bills. Congress, which lacked the majority needed to override a veto, had little hope of 
moving forward without some presidential support. A continuing resolution kept 
government running for a while, but it expired without a replacement bill in November 
1995, and the government shut down for five days. The Republican leadership had a 
zealous rank and file and many new members who were energized by the party’s new 
majority status. The leadership could not back down on its demands. Another continuing 
resolution passed, but government shut down again for roughly three weeks over the New 
Year. The deal that resulted from talks during that shutdown has largely been deemed a 
Democratic win (primarily a win for Clinton) politically, as the public largely blamed 
Republicans for the impasse. But Republicans were a force in Congress again, and their 
issues were on the table.  
Fiscal year 1998 experienced the first budget surplus in three decades. Despite the 
reputation that the decade gained for stalemate and growing partisanship, it has also 
gained a reputation for leading towards the deficit surpluses of 1998 to 2001. Supporters 
of both Speaker Gingrich and President Clinton have been quick to claim that the 
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Balanced Budget and Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 deserves the credit. It was a deal that 
happened in a high-stress environment under divided government, yes, but it depended on 
discretionary reforms and a booming economy while leaving the tough issues—namely, 
entitlements—for another generation to solve. One of the primary goals of the architects 
of the CBA was to put mandatory spending in conversation with the rest of the budget 
and establish sustainable priorities; it had only managed to place them in conflict. 
Ippolito argues that the surpluses proved the effectiveness of reconciliation as a tool to 
grease the slides of political budgetary friction.284 LeLoup credits the effectiveness of 
spending caps in the BEA as enforcement mechanisms—as opposed to the failure of 
deficit targets under GRH. But Pitney pointed out in an interview that rapid economic 
growth characterized the 1990s and argues that the dot com bubble and the end of the 
Cold War were the more likely causes of rising revenues and falling deficits.285 The 
continued growth of party polarization during this time of deficit reduction suggests that 
the economy was more the cause than some grand political bargain or success. In a time 
of purported inter-party cooperation, from 1991 to 2001, party unity grew by 22.75 
points, accounting for nearly 29.7 percent of the increase in overall party unity from 1974 
to 2010.286 So, roughly 29.7 percent of party unity growth occurred during 27.8 percent 
of the timescale, indicating that party polarization sped up, if anything, during this 
period.287 Further, FY1999 and FY 2002—two of the four years that experienced a 
budget surplus—are also two of the six fiscal years from FY1999 to FY2012 that did not 
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see a budget resolution. In 1998, while in talks over the FY1999 budget, the chambers 
(both Republican-controlled) could not reconcile due to institutional differences that 
changed the nature of the proposed budgets in each chamber. The House was able to pass 
a more extreme proposal that adhered to the Contract with America because the lower 
chamber is built to execute the will of the majority, while the Senate had to accommodate 
more liberal views.288 All history leading up this point has suggested that lack of 
resources creates conflict. That is what makes budgeting contentious; it is a fight over 
scarce resources. So the growth of resources, like we saw in the 1990s, should have 
partially alleviated that conflict, all else equal. Perhaps polarization had already taken 
such a hold at this point that the ideological sorting was largely complete, and contention 
over the deficit did not need to exist in order for two solidified political parties to have 
difficulty reconciling comprehensive budgeting desires. 
Starting in 1999, Congress began experiencing increasing difficulty passing a 
budget resolution. For the FY1999, FY2003, FY2005, and FY2007 budgets, each 
chamber reached an agreement but could not reconcile with the other.289 For FY2011 and 
FY2012, the budgets did not reach the conference stage.290 The increasing difficulty of 
complying with the requirement of a comprehensive legislative budget corresponds well 
with increasing partisanship. It is easy to see that partisanship contributes to the 
breakdown of the budget process, but the relationship goes the other way as well: the 
harder it is for the parties to reconcile each year, the more the comprehensive budget 
                                                      
288
 U.S. Congress, House, Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1999 – Hon. Constance A. 
Morella (Extention of Remarks), 105th Cong., 1st Sess., Congressional Record, (June 4, 1998), 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r105:E05JN8-217:/ (accessed April 27, 2013). 
289
 Heniff and Murray, “Congressional Budget Resolutions: Historical Information,” 9-10. 
290
 Ibid. 
95 
 
 
 
becomes a procedural relic that worked temporarily in a certain set of circumstances for a 
specific purpose. Kettl asked: “Why can’t the president produce a budget that is not 
declared ‘dead on arrival’ immediately on its release?”291 In divided government, the 
president’s budget resolution is useful only insomuch as it is a rhetorical tool for partisan 
competition. (Keep in mind that Kettl wrote those words in 2003, before the 2010 
midterms, before the debt ceiling standoff, and before the fiscal cliff crisis; he would be 
even more perplexed today.) 
 
III. CONTEMPORARY BUDGETING PRACTICES 
The surpluses of the late 1990s did not last long. Many factors, including defense 
spending in Iraq and Afghanistan, rising entitlement spending, and the Economic Growth 
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (better known as the “Bush tax cuts”) have 
been cited as deficit-driving forces in the early 2000s. Recession and stimulus spending 
were additional driving forces in the latter half of the decade. The 2010 midterm elections 
brought in a new, young class of reform-minded Republicans as the national discussion 
centered on the budget once again. In talks over the 2011 debt ceiling crisis, top 
congressional party leaders and the president agreed on the largely procedural BCA as a 
set of mechanisms to work towards deficit control. The BCA took a page out of the 
Congress’s first attempt at comprehensive budgeting in the Legislative Reorganization 
Act of 1948, which created a committee with representation from both chambers and 
varied areas of expertise within the realm of budget-related issues. The BCA created the 
Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction, a higher-profile, higher-pressure version of the 
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budget committees, failed to reach a deal, and Congress ultimately failed to meet the 
deficit-reduction targets by the deadline. Congress forestalled sequestration for two 
months and then allowed it to go into effect. The BCA was another example of how 
added rigidity and controls in the budget process only add to polarization while failing to 
create results because the threat (sequestration) is not sufficiently motivating. Reforms 
such as the BCA are especially damaging because they signal a desire for control on the 
part of Congress and then fail to follow through, forcing both parties to avert blame and 
adding to public disillusionment about the institution, particularly the party with which 
they do not identify.  The core component of the BCA, the BEA, and GRH was 
comprehensive budgeting—the BEA the least so. All sought comprehensive solutions 
with various added controls, and the more polarized Congress gets, the more divisive that 
concept will be. 
In recent years, the Democrat-dominated Senate has chosen not to pass a budget 
because the Democrats deemed it politically imprudent, and the Republican-dominated 
House has passed budgets knowing they would be “dead on arrival” both in the Senate 
and on the President Obama’s desk. Congress has always found meeting the annual 
budget schedule trying, but the past three years have seen heightened gridlock. In the 
earlier years of the new process, the budget committee met its requirement every year. 
Congress had only completely missed a budget resolution six years out of 37 as of April 
2013, but all six fell in the last fourteen budgets, with increasing frequency: fiscal years 
1999, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2011, and 2012. Still, Congress has passed the concurrent 
resolution by the deadline only six times (the deadline is April 15 now, but it was May 15 
until the passage of the 1985 Balanced Budget Act), showing that producing the budget 
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proposal was never an easy task. In the early 2000s, right after a short period of 
surpluses, defense spending, mandatory spending, and the Bush tax cuts combined to 
make deficits a bigger problem than ever. During these years of unprecedented deficits, 
from 2002 to 2012, that Congress failed to pass a budget resolution every other year. As 
the 1990s revealed, shrinking deficits do not ease partisanship; but more recent history 
suggests that climbing deficits certainly increase party conflict. Deficits are higher than 
ever, and Congress and the president have barely escaped government shutdown a 
handful of times.  
The breakdown of the budget process has reverted the process back to an 
increasingly ad hoc process, thrown together with continuing resolutions, omnibus bills, 
and temporary committees. When Ellwood uses the term “ad hoc budgeting,” he is 
referring to the pre-1974 disjointed, uncoordinated decision making that characterized in 
congressional budgeting. His opinion is that the pre-1974 budget process was an effective 
way to budget, as it did not force choices on one option or another. Kettl applies the term 
“ad hoc” to the modern budget process, with a very different meaning. Today (and going 
back to the 1980s, not long after the passage of the CBA) budgeting is again happening 
on an unpredictable schedule. A handful of power brokers make ad hoc decisions in 
conjunction with the president rather than in the halls of Congress with the input of each 
individual member and the pressures of each individual’s separate constituency. The 
process today is ad hoc in the sense that Congress does not follow “predictable 
procedures set by a regular calendar”—but the process is still comprehensive in the sense 
that any negotiation or deal is conducted with the whole government in mind.292 
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Although the process is unpredictable, Congress is still dealing in comprehensive 
budgeting, and, what is more, it is dealing in comprehensive budgeting with powerful 
congressional leadership. Furthermore, Congress finds itself in a political environment 
that is hyper-focused on deficits, with interest groups that are hyper-aware that their 
programs are on the chopping block. Entitlements are consuming a larger and larger 
portion of the federal budget and leaving less and less for discretionary programs, and a 
strong countermovement against any tax increases has risen in the past three to four 
years. The new budget process has helped to make special interests more important.293 
That development, as Olson said, makes the nation ungovernable.294 In a budget process 
that does not follow a strict timeline, powerful and well-connected lobbies are more 
capable of exerting influence than those without connections.295 This is a form of public 
participation, but it is “even more dominated than usual by those with an inside access to 
the process” because of the rise of comprehensive ad hoc budgeting.296  
The clearly delineated annual budget process has broken down into budget 
summits and closed-door sessions. Kettl describes the phenomenon: “With authorizations 
made for longer periods, appropriations covering less of the budget, and budget 
resolutions rendered meaningless by last-minute summits, congressional budgeting is 
scarcely a textbook example of an ordered process. The result has been growing power 
for congressional leaders in hammering out the agreements.”297 Budgeting today does not 
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sound very different from lawmaking on the rest of Capitol Hill. In Unorthodox 
Lawmaking, Barbara Sinclair argued that federal lawmaking is increasingly relying on 
summits and grand bargains rather than on the traditional bottom-up model of lawmaking 
through introduction, committee assignment, mark-up, etc.298 She explains how the 
“Textbook Congress” was the point at which lawmaking began to transform into a new 
“unorthodox” style of lawmaking. The same is true for budgeting—perhaps on an even 
grander scale than authorization legislation. Doing anything in American politics is 
inherently a disjointed and multifaceted process; the Founders created three branches, 
two chambers of Congress, and multiple members per state within each chamber so that 
the interests of all Americans would be both represented and checked. Further, budgeting 
is an even more disjointed process, as it must address and prioritize the needs and desires 
of every element of government. Budgeting in American government cannot be 
streamlined; it cannot accommodate comprehensive review, and comprehensive 
budgeting cannot survive in a bottom-up fashion for long. By instituting a budget process 
that is wholly contingent upon internal discipline, Congress created a budget process that 
does not fit the institution—and then built on it. 
The House Budget Committee is regaining its position as a budgetary leader, but 
it uses the budget resolution as a rhetorical tool for launching the majority party’s agenda, 
producing budgets that are politically infeasible in the upper chamber. In an interview the 
day House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan’s 2014 budget came out, 
congressional scholar John Makin called the fundamentally opposed budgets of Ryan and 
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the president the “opening salvos” of the next year’s budget fight.299 After watching 
budget proposals for 25 years, Makin says he only looks at them in order to gauge where 
each side is starting negotiations for the year.300 Despite the development of the budget 
resolution into a party tool, the CBA has a valid place in American politics. If not for the 
CBA, budgetary power may never have returned to its rightful place, and if not for the 
many factors that caused party polarization, the U.S. might still be seeking “clarity” in its 
political system. Regardless of opinions on the pros and cons of these developments, the 
explanation of party polarization in American politics is incomplete without an 
understanding of comprehensive budgeting. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
“The budget is…more than a story of decision making. It is a unique window into the 
very core of American democracy.” – Donald F. Kettl 
 
Partisanship and deficits characterize American political life today. The federal budget 
process is not wholly responsible for either phenomenon, but it guides interaction 
between the two. The goals that it sets also establish public expectations, and the extent 
to which lawmakers comply with those goals has bearing over public faith in 
government. Partisanship is not all that matters to constructive political interaction, and 
deficits are not all that matter to good governance. Many budget and general political 
reforms focus their attention toward these two issues. But such reforms are misdirected. 
 In a way, the CBA came the closest out of any of the reforms discussed in this 
study to shifting budgeting back to its constitutional place. But in doing so, it placed the 
weight of the largest budget conflicts in the nation’s history on the shoulders of the 
branch least equipped to find solutions quickly. But that impediment to fast action is 
precisely why the Founders placed budgetary power in the legislature’s hands. Fast action 
in budgeting would make for rapid changes in the size and scope of government with 
every change in government control. Insufficient deliberation might allow for bad policy. 
Deliberation on the full scope of government might have been a requisite of the 
congressional reclamation of budgetary power from the president in 1974. But at the 
same time, leadership’s power rose, the incidence of divided government increased, 
social issues changed, mandatory spending grew, interest groups multiplied, and the 
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availability of public information swelled. Comprehensive budgeting quickly became a 
divisive annual task in Congress. The dilemma is, if Congress were to relinquish 
budgetary power again, it is very possible that a branch built to function hierarchically 
and rapidly would resume precedence over budgeting at the precise moment when the 
nation is most in need of deep contemplation of its priorities.  
 The negatives of party polarization are well documented. A certain degree of 
friction is arguably a positive thing because it helps ensure that lawmakers and voters 
continue thinking about the perennial question of the role of government. Two-party 
gridlock, on the other hand, presses pause on forward movement, allowing pressure to 
mount and leaving decisions unmade. But that very pressure can push the system past 
gridlock, likely producing a better, more lasting policy outcome than a swift decision 
would have produced. A handful of budget scholars, including Schick and LeLoup, have 
reached the conclusion that the rising political pressures associated with deficits and 
gridlock will eventually compel compromise or the triumph of one party over the other. 
In a strange cycle of interaction, budget concerns—the very force that has so often 
created conflict—will likely help the American governmental system surmount conflict.  
But that analysis is unsatisfying to a broader audience—especially to a public that 
is understandably disillusioned with Congress. So, the discussion of future reform 
remains important. The three general camps of opinions on budget process reform are, 1) 
budget reforms are meaningless without strong leadership and political will, 2) the view 
that Congress had tended to follow, that process can provide results in a polarized system, 
and 3) Fisher’s view, that “a good process may not guarantee success, but it is a 
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prerequisite for acceptable results.”301 The first fits in with the conclusion that pressure 
will eventually force action; sufficient political will to make controversial choices cannot 
arise unless the consequences of not compromising exceed the consequences of giving up 
ground on the party agenda. But emphases on lawmakers’ need to show leadership in the 
face of controversy tend to dismiss the difficult realities that members face in an electoral 
system. The second camp of opinions on budgetary reform represents the problem that 
this paper largely dealt with—the tendency of Congress to try to control itself, to no 
avail. The third group is the most reasonable and is largely a good guiding principle in 
the abstract. But Fisher’s conclusion with this guiding principle is that Congress should 
return budgetary power to the president. Fisher argues that a budget process in which the 
President presents budget aggregates to Congress and Congress acts within those 
numbers, maintaining the ability to shuffle spending priorities, would play to the 
strengths of both branches and improve budgeting practice in contrast to today’s 
environment in which Congress views the president’s budget as “dead on arrival.” Not 
only would Congress today refuse to adhere to such a process, but moving in this 
direction would return the process to the dilemma that the Founders gave Congress the 
power of the purse for a reason. 
Seeking budget process reform is problematic for the same reason that budgeting 
is problematic for Congress: there is no clear definition of success, no stated goal. Is the 
goal to enact the will of the majority? Is it ensuring that the budget is balanced? Is it 
seeking long-term good governance? If so, what constitutes good governance? These are 
questions that are both unanswerable and widely disputed. 
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But the situation is not hopeless, as we can attempt to draw on past budgeting 
experiences and apply them to an understanding of the current political environment. 
Recall political scientist Sarah Binder’s commentary that “pears don’t unripen.” The 
analysis that current polarized conditions are permanent takes a somewhat insular view; 
the history of political parties in America has involved far more than two lines, and 
hyperpolarized conditions have existed before only to be broken down and reorganized. 
But the current system does not have time to wait for a new political realignment, as the 
contemporary party lines will not likely undergo a major shift for quite some time. If the 
current ideologically polarized environment is here to stay, at least for a while, even the 
best process and the best leaders would not be able to reconcile the fundamental conflict 
between the two veins of thought in American government. If polarization is somewhat 
permanent, then any attempt at budget process reform should keep that reality in mind. 
Such reforms should shift away from comprehensive budgeting, as counterintuitive as 
that seems, in order to lower the threshold at which pressure might force decision 
making. Congress needs more “space for maneuvering” without having to cede power to 
the president. Further, Congress needs to be able to address the driving forces of the 
deficit, most importantly Medicare and Social Security; the remainder of the budget, for 
the time being, is a distraction that impedes decision making on the most pressing issues. 
Therefore, a forum for discussing reforming entitlements to sustainable structures 
(focusing only on how to make entitlements sustainable, not on their relationship to the 
overall budget) might help Congress take a step towards a solution without the political 
consequences of a whole-of-government approach. 
Unfortunately, the vast majority of reform proposals on the table right now are 
largely superficial. Lengthening the budgeting period to biennial budgeting would give 
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Congress more time, but Congress showed with its inability to comply with the BCA in a 
year and a half that more time does not help solve partisan differences. A balanced 
budget amendment would fail to establish relative spending priorities, potentially 
increasing conflict. Providing the president with a line item veto, whereby he could 
recommend that specific budget lines be sent back to Congress for an up or down vote, 
would not solve the driving forces of the debt. Future research might be well served to 
explore reforms that provide Congress with tools—such as reconciliation—rather than 
restricting Congress’s options. Also, future research into reconciliation itself with regard 
to partisanship might be useful because reconciliation is simultaneously a tool for party 
warfare and a mechanism for producing real policy results. But perhaps the most 
important area for future research is the relationship between the executive and the post-
1974 comprehensive budget process. Specifically, studying the ways in which different 
presidents have interacted with the new budget process in relation to partisan politics 
would help provide a more complete understanding of how comprehensive budgeting fits 
into the over political system. 
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